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A lot of contemporary cloud computing platforms offer Infrastructure-
as-a-Service provisioning model, which offers to deliver basic virtual-
ized computing resources like storage, hardware, and networking as
on-demand and dynamic services. However, a single cloud service
provider does not have limitless resources to offer to its users, and in-
creasingly users are demanding the features of extensibility and inter-
operability with other cloud service providers. This has increased the
complexity of the cloud ecosystem and resulted in the emergence of
the concept of an Inter-Cloud environment where a cloud computing
platform can use the infrastructure resources of other cloud computing
platforms to offer a greater value and flexibility to its users. However,
there are no common models or standards in existence that allows
the users of the cloud service providers to provision even some basic
services across multiple cloud service providers seamlessly, although
admittedly it is not due to any inherent incompatibility or proprietary
nature of the foundation technologies on which these cloud computing
platforms are built. Therefore, there is a justified need of investigating
models and frameworks which allow the users of the cloud computing
technologies to benefit from the added values of the emerging Inter-
Cloud environment. In this dissertation, we present a novel security
model and protocols that aims to cover one of the most important
gaps in a subsection of this field, that is, the problem domain of pro-
visioning secure communication within the context of a multi-provider
Inter-Cloud environment. Our model offers a secure communication
framework that enables a user of multiple cloud service providers to
provision a dynamic application-level secure virtual private network
on top of the participating cloud service providers. We accomplish
this by taking leverage of the scalability, robustness, and flexibility of
peer-to-peer overlays and distributed hash tables, in addition to novel
usage of applied cryptography techniques to design secure and efficient
admission control and resource discovery protocols. The peer-to-peer
approach helps us in eliminating the problems of manual configura-
tions, key management, and peer churn that are encountered when
setting up the secure communication channels dynamically, whereas
the secure admission control and secure resource discovery protocols
plug the security gaps that are commonly found in the peer-to-peer
overlays. In addition to the design and architecture of our research
contributions, we also present the details of a prototype implementa-
tion containing all of the elements of our research, as well as showcase
our experimental results detailing the performance, scalability, and
overheads of our approach, that have been carried out on actual (as
opposed to simulated) multiple commercial and non-commercial cloud
computing platforms. These results demonstrate that our architecture
incurs minimal latency and throughput overheads for the Inter-Cloud
VPN connections among the virtual machines of a service deployed
on multiple cloud platforms, which are 5% and 10% respectively. Our
results also show that our admission control scheme is approximately
82% more efficient and our secure resource discovery scheme is about
72% more efficient than a standard PKI-based (Public Key Infras-
tructure) scheme.
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1.1 Overview of Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is an extension of the Grid Computing [67] where computing
resources are delivered as a service, typically over the Internet. It follows a dis-
tributed computational model of a large pool of shared, and usually, virtualised
computing resources like storage, processing power, memory, applications, ser-
vices, and network bandwidth. The users of a cloud computing service provider
(CSP) can be provisioned and de-provisioned resources as per their demand in
real-time. Its architecture can be split into two parts, front-end and back-end. The
front-end is a network accessible interface to the users, organizations, and appli-
cations that are using the cloud services. The back-end is typically a large-scale
data centre with a huge pool of storage, computational and network resources.
The cloud service provider gives the end users access to the cloud-based appli-
cations through the front-end interface, which is usually a web interface, either in
form of a web portal or REST (REpresentational State Transfer) based Application
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Programming Interface (API) calls, to manage and use the back-end resources
they have purchased. The end users are generally oblivious to the tools and tech-
niques being used to provide them with these services (hence the phrase in the
cloud). The main benefits thus achieved are the reduction or elimination of in-
frastructure costs, improved manageability and dynamic adjustment of resources
to meet the changing computation, I/O or networking demands. According to the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [115], there are three basic
models associated with cloud computing:-
1. Software as a Service (SaaS)
2. Platform as a Service (PaaS)
3. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
In the SaaS model, software applications are offered to end users through a
web browser or a thin client. These are almost entirely stored and managed in
the cloud and the users do not manage the cloud infrastructure and platform on
which the application is running. This is suitable for applications in the domain of
social networking, collaboration, media and content management etc. Examples
include Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems like salesforce.com
[136], email services like Gmail [33], Outlook.com [119] etc., online games like
FarmVille [163] etc. and storage services like Wuala [74] and Dropbox [83] etc.
The PaaS model provides a Computing Platform, which is usually a cus-
tomised environment meant to facilitate the design, development and deployment
of applications. it typically includes operating system, programming language,
execution environment, database, web server and load balancer etc. This moves
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the responsibility of managing the underlying hardware and software layers off the
application developer and to the cloud service provider. Examples include Ama-
zon Elastic Beanstalk [5], Google App Engine [72] and Windows Azure Compute
[118].
The IaaS model provides creation of virtual hardware resources including vir-
tual machines, virtual networks and virtualized storage. Cloud providers offer
these resources on demand from their large resource pools installed in data cen-
tres across the globe. The users have to install and manage operating systems
on the machines as well as their application software. Examples include services
like Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud(EC2) [7], Amazon Simple Storage Service
(S3) [8], Flexiant [66] and Rackspace Cloud [131].
There are primarily four cloud deployment models, as recommended by the





Private Cloud is a model in which the infrastructure is operated solely for a
single organization. It might be managed internally or by a third-party and also
might be hosted internally or externally. This is used usually to address concerns
related to data security and trust issues.
In the Public Cloud model, the cloud services are made available to the gen-
eral public by a Cloud Service Provider (CSP). The services might be free (Gmail
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Figure 1.1: A logical view of cloud computing, showing examples of the three
basic service models i.e. Infrastructure, Platform and Application/Software that
can be accessed from a variety of computational devices [161]
etc.) or offered on a pay-per-use model (Amazon EC2 etc.).
In the Community Cloud model, the cloud infrastructure is shared by several
organisations with a common policy, security and/or legal considerations. This
helps to reduce costs as compared to a private cloud as it is shared by larger
set of organisations.For example government departments requiring access to
the same information related to infrastructure, such as hospitals, roads, electrical
stations, etc., can utilize a community cloud.
A Hybrid Cloud is the combination of two or more clouds (private, community
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or public) to offer the benefits of multiple deployment models. For example, if
the existing private cloud infrastructure is not able to handle the user load, the
cloud can shift workloads between public and private hosting without any service
degradation to the users.
1.2 Characteristics of Cloud Computing
The current buzz around the cloud computing paradigm is due to a number of key
benefits that it provides, which also makes it an interesting research domain in
both academia and the industry [12], [38], [37] . Some of these benefits are :-
• It provides its users with a very low management overhead.
• It gives fast and easy access to a wide range of applications and services.
• It incurs low maintenance cost on its users as a third party is responsible for
the base operations.
• It has the flexibility to scale up and down the resources provided to the users
depending on their real-time requirements.
• Its users have the choice to access their services and applications wherever
they are from a large variety of devices.
• It offers a cost-effective business model as the users pay only for what they
use.
Fig 1.2 shows a survey done by International Data Corporation (IDC) [70]
indicating why customers want to incorporate the cloud computing paradigm in
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Figure 1.2: A survey showing the answers when 244 IT executives were asked to
rate the importance of a variety of cloud services that benefit their organizations.
This chart shows the percentage of respondents rating each benefit a 4 or 5, on
a 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) scale [70].
their businesses. It is abundantly clear from this figure that there are two key
driving factors for the rapid adoption of cloud computing. The first is its economic
benefits, and the second being the speed, flexibility and ease of use that it offers
to its users for managing and using their IT resources.
1.3 Challenges of Cloud Computing
Most of the currently available IaaS cloud computing solutions are mainly focused
on providing functionalities and services at the infrastructure level, e.g., improved
performance for virtualization of compute, storage and network resources, as well
as necessary fundamental functionality such as virtual machine (VM) migrations
and server consolidation etc. The main reason behind this is that IaaS is the most
basic kind of cloud offering as it only delivers raw resources whereas PaaS and
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IaaS solutions deliver complex systems like development tools, dynamic libraries,
and application life-cycle management suites etc. [69], [147] .
In the cases when higher-level and more abstract concerns need to be ad-
dressed, existing Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) solutions tend to focus on
functional aspects only. Furthermore, if a cloud’s computational and storage in-
frastructure resources are overloaded due to increased workloads, its services
towards its clients will degrade. The idea of an Inter-Cloud [34] [44] [143] has
been gaining much traction to address such a situation, where a cloud can bor-
row the required infrastructure resources of other clouds. However, in order to
progress from a basic cloud service infrastructure to a more adaptable cloud ser-
vice ecosystem, there is a great need for tools and services that support and
provide higher-level concerns and non-functional aspects in a comprehensive
manner.
There are three fundamental steps in the life cycle of a service in the cloud
computing ecosystem; the construction of the service, the deployment of the ser-
vice to one or more IaaS clouds and lastly the operational management of the
service. In the resulting scenarios, the presence of the multiple IaaS providers
in the cloud ecosystem is the key issue that needs to be addressed by any inter-
cloud security solution.
A major goal of service owners is to select IaaS providers in an efficient way
in order to host the different components of their services on appropriate clouds.
In this respect, third-party cloud brokers [68] can play a major role in simplifying
the use, performance and delivery of the cloud services. These brokers can also
offer an inter-mediation layer spanning across multiple cloud providers to deliver a
host of optimization and value-added services which take advantage of the myriad
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Figure 1.3: A survey showing the answers when 244 IT executives were asked to
rate the top challenges facing adoption of cloud computing in their organizations
in 2008. This chart shows the percentage of respondents rating each challenge
a 4 or 5, on a 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) scale [70].
individual cloud services e.g., aggregation of different services or arbitration for a
best-match service from multiple similar services.
For the numerous interaction possibilities among these parties, whatever the
usage scenarios maybe, the security of data and the communication between the
consumers of the service and its multiple providers is of paramount importance.
This can be demonstrated by the results of a survey done by International Data
Corporation (IDC) [70] in December 2009. As shown in Fig 1.3, the top challenge
identified by 87.5 % of the sources is Security. These results show case the




In the light of the above discussion, we advocate that an inter-cloud security so-
lution is highly desirable that would provide a framework enabling seamless and
secure communication between the different actors of a cloud ecosystem over
multiple cloud platforms. Such a solution, however, has to overcome a number
of challenges because of architectural limitations. This is because most of the
current cloud service platforms, and the multi-tenants environments they offer,
make it difficult to give their consumers flexible and scalable control over the core
security aspects of their services like encryption, secure communication and key
management etc. There have been previous attempts to address these security
issues concerning the nature of the problem that we are addressing, but most
of these have been of limited scope. This has been mainly due to the assump-
tions made for the creation of the models of the computation and communication
architectures. We discuss these in much further detail in Chapter 2.
Most of the existing solutions in this domain are based on some variation of a
centralised point-of-control scheme for all of the security concerns of a commu-
nication model, which does not scale well as the entities in that model increase.
This is especially a major concern in a multi-cloud communication paradigm where
the number of virtual machines can increase or decrease dynamically depending
on the application and user work loads. To cater for this particular issue, we need
a secure communication approach that is flexible to adapt to the churn of virtual
machines and also to their deployment locations. This involves having a decen-
tralised control mechanism as well as having an architecture that is tolerant of
participating entities leaving the communication framework unannounced or join-
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ing it dynamically. We aim to demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed solution
in this regard by first modelling the dynamics of the communicating entities in
a multi-cloud scenario and then measuring the performance of our solution with
respect to how quickly can it admit the newly joining members into the communi-
cation framework and how resilient it is to members leaving the framework.
Further limitation of most of the existing work is the amount of manual work
needed to set up the solutions they are employing. This is in terms of practical
work needed for the installations, dependency resolutions, configurations and op-
erations etc. The scaling problem comes into play here as well as the number of
entities that need to be managed like this increases. This is also aggravated by
the lack of dynamic network configurability in most cloud providers caused by the
inherent limitations of the fixed network architectures offered by these providers.
Therefore, one of our security engineering objective is to address the requirement
of minimum manual configuration and deployment and focus on a launch-and-
forget type of solution. In order to achieve this objective, we have to ensure the
security and consistency of the entities participating in the communication frame-
work as well. We demonstrate this by constructing this feature as a component
of our architecture that will have the following properties:-
1. Centralised policy-based specification for the operation and security asso-
ciations of the communication framework.
2. Distributed mechanism to carry out the policy’s actions, where each entity
will have the responsibility for its own configuration.
3. The policy actions should be idempotent and consistent, i.e. the multiple
applications of a policy rule will not change the result beyond the initial ap-
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plication, until the next deviation is propagated in the distributed system by
the configuration management component.
Another area of limitation in related literature is comprehensive security man-
agement in general and key management in particular, as this issue is either
handled in a trivial manner with very little details provided or not discussed at all
in any length. For us the security of the overall solution is of paramount impor-
tance, but it also needs an efficient and scalable design. We achieve this aim by
trying to include the concepts of application partitioning and security by isolation
in our solution. More specifically, we have come up with an intra-application sand-
boxing architecture where we partition our solution into different parts and then
securing each part by using a set of different security schemes. As each part is
logically separated by the other ones and employing different security schemes,
its compromise cannot directly affect the whole solution. The main challenge we
have to address here is how to partition the system into meaningful parts and
which security scheme to then design and apply for each part. We investigate the
partitioning of the solution with respect to the different stages of its life-cycle and
describe the design of the security schemes that we have designed to be applied
at those stages.
Lastly, to determine the efficiency of our solution we have to measure its per-
formance and compare it with similar works. This introduces a major challenge
as direct comparison with most of the related work is almost impossible because
of the issues like vastly different test and simulation environments, architecture
of the solutions and availability of reproducible results from the related work. We
address this problem by identifying the important performance metrics that are
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commonly measured and noted when encountering a work of this nature and
then designing suitable experiments. We then demonstrate the results produced
in light of those metrics by running those experiments on multiple commercial
cloud platforms and comparing the performance of our solution with experiments
run in the same environment but without any security enhancements and fea-
tures.
1.5 Research Objectives
We have done an extensive literature review of the secure communication mech-
anisms and frameworks that can be used, either in their current forms or with
modifications, to protect the communication channels between physical or virtual
machines deployed on different cloud platforms. The various limitations, gaps,
and shortcomings of the reviewed works are explored further in Chapter 2. By
analysing these limitations and gaps in the existing work in detail, we have been
able to identify the objectives of our research effort. These objectives will help
with the addressing the shortcomings of the existing works, as well as contribute
towards improvement of the robustness and security of communication frame-
works with-in the scope of the inter-cloud environment. We classify our main
objectives in four categories :-
Objective 1: Distributed inter-cloud communication framework
• To design and develop a communication framework that enables the com-
ponents of an application deployed in an inter-cloud environment to com-
municate with each other.
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• To investigate and design a decentralised command and control mechanism
for its management and operation so that it does not have a single point of
failure.
• To explore and develop an efficient resource discovery mechanism for the
communication framework so that the distributed entities that constitute the
communication framework are able to share and manage the keys they re-
quire for their security operations.
Objective 2: Security
• To design and develop a security mechanism that ensures the integrity and
confidentiality of the network traffic between the components of an applica-
tion utilising our inter-cloud communication framework.
• To tightly and seamlessly integrate the security mechanism with the inter-
cloud communication framework in such a way that it causes minimum over-
head for the throughput and latency of the communication.
• To design and develop a security protocol for preventing unauthenticated
and unauthorised actors from gaining admission to the communication frame-
work and compare its performance with a standard security protocol.
• To design and develop a security protocol for protecting the resource discov-
ery mechanism used for key management in the communication framework




• To design and architect the secure communication framework in such a way
that it is able to scale with the increased workload.
• To design and develop an architecture for measuring the load scalability of
the communication framework in terms of operations it is able to perform
when increasing or decreasing the number of the distributed entities.
Objective 4: Ease of Use
• To design and architect the secure communication framework in such a way
that it minimizes the complexity of manual deployment and configuration for
its operation in a multi-cloud environment.
In summary, the overall aim of this research is to address the secure, flex-
ible and scalable communication concerns that in our view must be overcome
in order to provide holistic provisioning of services to consumers from multiple
cloud service providers. We aim to present the architecture and design of an
inter-cloud secure communication framework that offers the features of dynamic
and scalable virtual network formation, efficient and scalable key management
and minimal manual configuration, all on top of secure and private communi-
cation between the components of the service across multiple cloud platforms.
Our architecture provides a virtual network using resources from multiple cloud
providers and offers the capability to transparently run applications on top of this





The main contributions of our research effort pertain to the design and architec-
ture of a secure, scalable and robust communication framework for cloud services
and applications running on virtual machines in a multi-cloud environment, with-
out persistent and centralised administration of all the secure connections. Based
on the detailed discussion in the previous and upcoming sections, we have fo-
cused on the following contributions in this domain:-
1. Design and architecture of a scalable inter-cloud secure communication
framework that works seamlessly with multiple cloud platforms.
2. A novel and efficient security protocol utilising the zero-knowledge proof
concept for controlling admission into a cloud service’s overlay network.
3. A novel and extremely low-overhead secure resource discovery scheme util-
ising functional encryption for scalable key management.
4. A novel process of using distributed hash tables as a command and control
channel for managing and operating the secure communication framework.
5. Deployment, experimentation and analyses of applications using the secure
communication framework on real-life commercial cloud platforms for real-
world evaluations.
Furthermore, the research carried out as a part of this effort has resulted in 1
book chapter, 1 international journal publication, 3 international conference pub-
lications and 1 patent. The detailed references of these publications and patents




The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we present the state-
of-the-art related works that address issues related to this domain and identify
their gaps and limitations. In Chapter 3 we explain in detail the background of
the technologies, methods and algorithms that we have utilised in the formulation
of our solution. In Chapter 4 we outline the key methodology for our approach
and elaborate on the detailed Inter-Cloud Virtual Private Network (ICVPN) archi-
tecture and design, as well as the experimental set up and the evaluation and
analysis of the performance results of our implementation. In Chapter 5 we elab-
orate on the design of the admission control component of our solution and show
its comparison with other related methods. In Chapter 6 we present the design
and implementation of the secure resource discovery component and compare its
efficiency with existing approaches. We conclude in Chapter 7 with a summary
of our contributions and achievements.
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Chapter 2
Review of Related Work
The concept of the Inter-Cloud has come into its own over the recent years as a
logical evolution of the cloud IaaS interoperability. Most of the commercial cloud
service providers designed and offered their services in such a way that the users
could not easily transition to another cloud service provider offering the same
service (this phenomenon is called vendor lock-in). However, due to the costumer
demands for more flexibility and choice, there has been some effort to come up
with solutions that allow the users to use the resources of multiple cloud service
providers to deploy their systems.
Although most of the attention in this area has been given to data storage use
cases, it is also clear to see that parts of customer softwares running on virtual
machines instances on different cloud platforms must be able to dialogue with
each other. One deployed instance of the software must be able to find one or
more other instances for a particular interoperability scenario and be able conduct
transactions or exchange whatever information or data that is required. Thus, an
inter-cloud communication protocol or framework is needed for the discovery and
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messaging needs that can support the one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-
many communication scenarios.
As of present, there is no such universal inter-cloud communication protocol
and certainly no universal inter-cloud communication security architecture that ex-
ists to address the above problem statement. The aim of our research is to come
up with such a secure communication framework and evaluate it with respect to
different metrics (discussed in detail in later chapters). In order to start this pro-
cess , we identify some of the key security challenges relevant to the inter-cloud
scenario that we will have to address:-
• Preserving the confidentiality and integrity of data in transit to and from a
cloud service instance (typically a virtual machine).
• Unauthorised access to the resources of the communication framework.
• Interception of data in transit (man-in-the-middle attacks).
• Making access to data or keys selectively available to authorised users and
entities.
Most of these challenges have been addressed quite successfully in the Inter-
net scenario by utilising Virtual Private Networks (VPN). Virtual private networks
have been a mainstay for providing secure remote access over wide-area net-
works to resources in private organizational networks for a long time [120], [106],
[54]. They give the illusion of establishing a connected network by setting up logi-
cal connections between end-points and securing them by using specialized soft-
ware that provides confidentiality and integrity of the traffic flowing between these
end-points by using well-known encryption techniques [16], [61], [20]. However,
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the thrust of our research effort is to provision a secure virtual private network
over a multi-cloud infrastructure.
In order to achieve this goal, we have identified a few requirements that help
us in evaluating the related work in relation to the gaps and limitations present in
them that make them unsuitable for an inter-cloud environment. Some of these
requirements have been discussed earlier in section 1.4 in detail. We were able
to establish these requirements as a result of our effort to understand the nature
of our target research environment, i.e., the inter-cloud and the objectives of in-
tended users of this environment, as discussed in existing literature like [34], [44],
and [143].
Additionally, we were also able to gather requirements for our research by
keeping track of the on-going attempts by IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers) to create technical standards (IEEE P2302 [88]) for inter-cloud
interoperability. Although the endeavours of IEEE are still in their infancy with
no concrete output thus far, it helped us to discern some useful requirements
from them that were in line with our findings from the study of the related work.
The main insight we were able to ascertain from analysing this material was that
the inter-cloud can not be a single entity, instead it should be a replicated and
hierarchical system. This was based on the observation that the current cloud
computing platforms, that will comprise the inter-cloud environment, are not yet
able to federate and interoperate.
From these sources and more, we were able to identify a few unfulfilled needs
and gaps that must be addressed by anyone who wants to research for a vi-
able inter-cloud communication framework with regards to security, scalability and
ease-of-use. We have have been able to render some of these needs and gaps
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into our research requirements and here we summarise the specific requirements
that should be catered for when researching the design and architecture of an
inter-cloud secure communication framework.
• The design of an inter-cloud communication framework should be decen-
tralised, no single-point-of-failure should exist in it.
• The access to the resource of a the communication framework should be
granted only after valid authentication procedures.
– The authentication procedures should be cryptographically strong, e.g.,
user-name/password based methods should be avoided.
– The authentication procedures should be efficient and easy to auto-
mate, e.g., Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based authentication might
be problematic in this situation due to complex key distribution scheme.
• The communication channels should operate on the lowest layer possible
of the TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol)networking
model in order to reduce performance overheads.
• The design of an inter-cloud communication framework should be scalable;
the framework should be not burdened as the number of communicating
entities in it increases.
• The management and configuration of the framework should be as simple
and automatic as possible; manual setting up of link and channels should
be avoided.
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• The communication framework should be practical in terms of performance,
i.e., it should be secure as that is a fundamental requirement but it should
add as low overheads due to that as possible.
• The design of the framework should be cloud platform independent and not
specific to any particular cloud service provider in order to allow the users
flexibility of choice as well as avoid vendor lock-in.
As mentioned above, the main thrust of our communication framework is the
provisioning of a secure virtual private network in a multi-cloud environment. Af-
ter an elaborate literature survey process, we were able to classify the existing
virtual private network techniques and solutions into four main categories. First
is the most common type of approach, i.e, those that model their solutions ac-
cording to the client-server model [25]. Second is the category of techniques and
solutions that construct a complete virtual network [81] consisting of virtual com-
putational and network entities as well as customised routing mechanisms. Third
category is composed of techniques that leverage peer-to-peer algorithms and
topologies [133] to construct resilient and fault tolerant virtual private networks.
Fourth and last is the most recent and relevant types of efforts that offer virtual
private networking services on cloud computing platforms [140]. We have picked
a few related works for further elaboration in the following sections. This is not
an exhaustive selection, rather we chose some main candidate recent works to
show-case the approaches they take to solve the problems and the common gaps
and limitations in these approaches.
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2.1 Client-Server based approaches
The discussion of design and architecture of almost all the client-server based
virtual private network solutions can be condensed by just discussing the design
and architecture of OpenVPN [167]. It is the most common and popular VPN
solution (5 million users worldwide as of June 2015 [168]) used to create secure
point-to-point or site-to-site connections for authenticated remote access [116],
[166].
An OpenVPN server runs the central VPN software and each client machine
needs to install a client software so that they can participate in the extended
network. This client application is usually installed and configured by an admin-
istrator and is done on a per-machine basis. OpenVPN uses industry standard
SSL/TLS (Secure Socket Layer and Transport Layer Security) protocols to pro-
vide confidentiality and integrity of the traffic exchanged between its end-points
[87], [27], [104]. It is based on a modular networking model that uses the TAP
(network tap) and TUN (network TUNnel) virtual networking devices as interfaces
between the client and server operating systems. The Universal TAP/TUN driver
[100] is a virtual network interface and its main purpose is to provide IP tunnelling
support to the operating system. Its appears as a network device to all the appli-
cations and users of the operating system and every application that can use a
network interface is able to use this virtual network interface as well. OpenVPN
listens on the TAP/TUN interface for all the network traffic that is being written to it
by the user applications, encrypts it and then sends it to the destination machine,
where another OpenVPN client will be present to receive the data from its TAP/-
TUN interface, decrypt it and give it to the user application waiting for it.
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Gaps and Limitations:
However, the main problem in client/server based approaches like OpenVPN
is that they require centralized servers to manage the life cycle of all the secure
connections for the participating clients, hence suffering from a single point-of-
failure. Furthermore, for authentication of the OpenVPN client, a simple user-
name / password based system is used. There is also the possibility of us-
ing a PKI based system for client authentication but that adds the further key
management complexity as well as the overheads associated with PKI-based ap-
proaches. This can be a major drawback as the issue of key distribution among
all the participating clients in a VPN is non-trivial, especially when the software
itself does not provide any key distribution service and all keys have to be man-
ually transferred to individual hosts [105]. In case of PKI model, an additional
requirement of a trusted Certificate Authority exists that has to issue individual
certificates to all the servers and clients constituting a VPN, which incurs an addi-
tional communication overhead when forming a virtual private network. Another
issue is the quite complex and error prone configuration problems especially if you
want to construct and manage a large-scale network not having a relatively simple
topology, as it would require customized configuration on every client and even
more elaborate management and routing configuration on the server-side. Lastly,
the amount of data transmitted using these VPN tools increases over time due to
the wrapping and tunnelling processes. This is known as the VPN overhead and
its cost depends on the amount of meta-data and the encryption techniques used
in the VPN. In OpenVPN, the use of TAP/TUN interface can introduce a large
overhead, especially for bursty and interactive traffic. We address all of these
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problems in our work.
2.2 Virtual Network based approaches
There have been some other VPN solutions for large-scale networks aimed at
grid and cluster computing environments, such as VIOLIN [92] and VNET [146],
that do not follow a strict client/server model based approach.
2.2.1 VNET
VNET is a layer 2 virtual networking tool that implements a virtual local area
network (VLAN) [57] over a wide area network (WAN) using layer 2 tunnelling
[154]. It relies on VNET servers running on a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)
that should have the capability to extract raw Ethernet packets sent by the virtual
network card and also the capability to inject raw Ethernet packets into the virtual
network card.
The operation of a VNET set up is shown in Fig 2.1. Basically, a VNET server
VM in a remote network establishes an TCP/SSL tunnel connection to a VNET
server running on a machine, called proxy, inside the user’s home network. All
of the remote virtual machine’s communication goes through this tunnel and the
goal of the proxy is to emulate the remote virtual machine as a local host on
the user’s home network, in effect presenting it as a member of the same LAN
(Local Area Network). So the proxy’s role is to act as a packet filtering gateway
that matches the Ethernet packets that it receives and passes them on to the
appropriate destinations by either directly injecting them into the virtual network
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of a VNET based communication framework, showing
the establishment of a secure connection between a client and the end host via a
proxy gateway [146].
interfaces of the VNET servers (in the case of destination being in the remote
network) or injecting them into the local LAN (in the case of the destination being
in the local network).
Gaps and Limitations:
The motivation of this approach is to tackle the user’s lack of administrative
control at remote grid sites to manipulate network resources like routing and re-
source reservations etc. but it suffers from the previously discussed problem of
complex and manual configuration, though trying to emulate the simplicity of a
private LAN. Also the scalability will be a big issue for the proxy as the number
of remote virtual machines grows as each will require a secure tunnel connec-
tion and corresponding virtual network interface mapped to the proxy’s network
interface by the VNET server software.
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2.2.2 VIOLIN
The VIOLIN (Virtual Internetworking on OverLay INfrastructure) architectural de-
sign offers is a small-scale virtual network with virtual routers, switches and end-
hosts. the complete design is composed of three layers, as shown in Fig 2.2. The
low-level plane is the actual layer 3 IP network, the mid-level plane denotes an
overlay infrastructure such as PlanetLab, and the top-level plane denotes a set
of VIOLIN entities that are created on the overlay infrastructure. There are three
types of VIOLIN entities which correspond to real network entities i.e., end-hosts,
switched LAN, and routers. All entities in the VIOLIN are implemented in soft-
ware and are hosted by User-Mode Linux (UML) [53] enabled virtual machines
as virtual appliances. This kind of design is aimed at allowing for the dynamic
establishment of a private layer 3 virtual network among virtual machines.
Gaps and Limitations:
VIOLIN does not offer dynamic or automatic network deployment or route
management to set up the virtual network. Virtual links are established between
the virtual appliances using encrypted UDP (User Datagram Protocol) [132] tun-
nels that have to be manually set up and are not self-configuring, making it cum-
bersome to establish inter-host connections in flexible and dynamic fashion.
2.3 Peer-to-Peer based approaches
There have been many peer-to-peer based VPN solutions proposed or imple-
mented, utilising various technologies such as multicast trees, gossip protocols,
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Figure 2.2: The architectural design of VIOLIN, showing the three composing
planes i.e., the bottom plane being the actual layer 3 network, the PlanetLab
overlay infrastructure acting as the middle plane, and the set of VIOLIN entities
that are created in the top plane [92].
and overlay broadcasts [94], [164], [75], [165], and [123]. We discuss two peer-
to-peer VPN solutions here, i.e., Hamachi [107] and N2N [50], that have come
up as peer-to-peer alternatives to the centralized and client/server model based
VPNs.
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2.3.1 Hamachi
Hamachi is a shareware application that is capable of establishing emulated di-
rect links between computers that are behind NAT (Network Address Translation)
firewalls. Thus it gives the illusion that the network peers on the internet are
connected to each other as if they were on the same local network. A back-
end cluster of servers is managed by the vendor and clients have to install the
client software on the end-user computers. The vendor managed VPN servers
are publicly accessible from the client’s network and each client can establish
and maintain a control connection to the server cluster. When a connection is
successfully established, the client goes through a user-name/password based
login process which authenticates the client to the server. This is followed by a
discovery process which is used to determine the topology of the client’s inter-
net connection, specifically to detect the presence of NAT and firewall devices
on its route to the public internet. This is followed by a synchronization process
that is used to share the status and information of the client’s connectivity details
with other members of its network. After all this is done, the client can construct
peer-to-peer tunnels with other clients using virtual network interfaces and NAT
traversal techniques (if the client is behind a NAT gateway or firewall). It is mainly
used for internet gaming and remote administration.
Fig. 2.3 shows how a Hamachi server helps two hosts establish direct virtual
communication links between each other while they are behind private NAT fire-
walls. In client A’s session message to the Hamachi server, A shares its private
socket address with it. The Hamachi server records client A’s reported private
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Figure 2.3: The Hamachi architecture for linking fire-walled peers. The fire-wall
functionality is usually provided by private NAT devices that are transparent to the
end-users of this service.
socket address, along with A’s public socket address as observed by the Hamachi
server itself. Similarly, when client B establishes its session, the Hamachi server
records B’s private socket address and it’s public socket address as well. After
this, client A sends a request message to the Hamachi server asking for help
connecting with client B. In response, the Hamachi server sends B’s public and
private socket addresses to A, and sends A’s public and private socket addresses
to B. Now, client A and client B can each start sending UDP (User Datagram Pro-
tocol) [132] datagrams directly to each other using this session information.
Gaps and Limitations:
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Hamachi suffers from scalability issues as each peer has to maintain the con-
nection with the server as well as any other peers it wants to communicate with.
This means that each client essentially has to deal with the overheads of a mesh-
topology. It therefore offers limited number of peers (16 per virtual network) and
limited number of concurrent clients (50 per virtual network), thus placing restric-
tions on the network size. The keys used for connection encryption and authen-
tication are also controlled by the vendor’s servers and individual users do not
initially control who has access to their network. While it offers to support different
kinds of key distribution mechanisms [108], the actual implementation apparently
only offers a Key Distribution Center (KDC) based approach [122], which requires
all peers of a VPN to establish trusted relationship with each other through the
central Hamachi website. Thus, it is not able to offer the users the feature of
independent VPN deployments.
2.3.2 N2N
N2N is a layer 2 VPN solution which does not require a centralized back-end
cluster of servers like Hamachi and the encryption keys are not managed or con-
trolled by the vendor. Each N2N node has a encryption key pre-shared among
the users that have been invited to join the peer-to-peer overlay. It uses a peer-to-
peer overlay network similar to Skype, where a number of dedicated super-nodes
are used as relay agents for edge nodes that cannot communicate directly with
each other due to firewall or NAT restrictions.
The edge nodes connect to a super-node at start-up and pre-shared TwoFish
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Figure 2.4: The N2N overlay network architecture showing the two kinds of nodes
i.e., Super Nodes and Edge Nodes. The figure depicts an example overlay where
two Super Nodes are connected to the Edge Nodes in a star topology, and the
communication between the Edge Nodes has to pass through the Super Nodes
(shown with dashed lines) [50].
[139] keys are used for link encryption. The N2N edge nodes are identified
uniquely by a 48-bit MAC address and a 128-bit community name. Edge nodes
use virtual Ethernet devices [100] to establish encrypted UDP tunnels between
each other.
Gaps and Limitations:
As it operates on layer 2, the users of the overlay have to configure their IP ad-
dresses and other network parameters. It also assumes node membership as
relatively static with edge nodes rarely leaving or joining the network over their
life cycle. This is certainly not true in the cloud computing domain where the
virtual machines are very expendable and can be created and destroyed quite
frequently. Lastly, the peer discovery method of N2N utilises the overlay broad-
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casting method [41]. This will increase the communication overhead of the sys-
tem, as the number of of peers increases.
Figure 2.5: Tunnelling between N2N nodes, with the logical communication pass-
ing through the UDP tunnel in user-space but the physical signals pass through
the tap devices in the kernel-space [50].
2.4 Cloud based approaches
In recent years, there have been a lot of attempts to investigate scalable and
secure virtual private network solutions for the cloud computing environment.
These include research efforts like Dynamic IP-VPN [79], IPsecVPN [89], and
Connectivity-as-a-Service [40]. Also, some commercial cloud computing services
have been made available by different vendors that provide a virtual private net-
work inside their public cloud offering and offering the customers some limited
degree of control over this network, which is called a Virtual Private Cloud (VPC).
Prime examples in this domain are Amazon Virtual Private Cloud [6], Google Se-
cure Data Connector [71] and CohsiveFT VPN-Cubed [47]. These are aimed
at enterprise customers to allow them to access their resource deployed on the
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vendor’s cloud over an IPsec (Internet Protocol Security) [55] based virtual private
network.
2.4.1 Dynamic IP-VPN
Dynamic IP-VPN is a research effort that aims to provides a virtual private net-
work for a private cloud deployment, using some dynamic features provided by
a next generation network. The next generation network used by this system is
GENI (Global Environment for Network Innovations) [23], which provides a virtual
test-bed for networking and distributed systems research. The main attractive
feature GENI for this system is its flexibility and programmability, i.e., it allows the
users to program not only the end hosts of their experimental network but also the
switches in the core of their network. This, in turn, allows them to experiment with
customised network layer protocols. Furthermore, all of the networking equip-
ment is virtualised and its components are made available to users as resources.
In that sense, its a more advanced version of VIOLIN [92], discussed earlier in
this chapter.
Fig. 2.6 shows the architecture that the next-generation network infrastructure
for the private cloud platform must offer their users. This architecture consists of
the following four dynamic components.
1. The edge node, called the Virtual Network Edge (VNE), that connects the
end-user terminals to the overlay network.
2. The forwarding node, called the Virtual Network Router (VNR), that relays
data sent from one VNE to another VNE.
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Figure 2.6: Architecture of the Dynamic IP-VPN showing the four dynamic com-
ponents comprising the system and their deployment locations in an overlay [79].
3. The signalling node, called the Virtual Network Generator (VNG), that helps
in the authentication and authorisation of the end-user terminal ahead of
connecting the terminal to the overlay network.
4. The routing node, called the Virtual Network Manager (VNM), that computes
the optimal route for the path between two VMEs and sends configuration
information to VNRs located on that path in order to establish a connection
between the two VNEs.
The authors implement this architecture on a GENI test-bed and measure the
throughput results on a LAN environment with a 100 Mbps (Megabits per second)
line speed specification. They get the throughput of approximately 8 Mbps for an
encrypted tunnel session between two VNEs.
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Gaps and Limitations:
The Dynamic IP-VPN architecture requires a specialised networking infrastruc-
ture that supports software-defined networking, a feature most of the current
cloud platforms do not support. Furthermore, the authors assume that the private
cloud platform deploying their solution will support multiple protocol programma-
bility in order to offer both Layer 2 and Layer 3 virtual private networks, using
IPsec, L2TP (Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol) and SSL-based VPNs. This is also
an unrealistic assumption in our opinion as typically a private cloud deployment
usage scenario is useful for a small company or user group, which usually do not
have the need of such flexibility. Lastly, the performance of the network through-
put really suffers due to the requirement of so much flexibility and even on a 100
Mbps LAN they get an overhead of 92%.
2.4.2 IPsec VPN
IPsec VPN is a research effort that aims to establish a secure VPN between
different private networks, that are connected via the Internet, in order to con-
struct a secure closed user group. The authors describe the two kinds of IPsec
VPN architectures currently being used, which they term as Full-Mesh IPsecVPN
and Hub-and-Spoke IPsecVPN. In case of Full-Mesh IPsecVPN, they envision
a model where the private networks are connected to each other directly via an
IPsec gateway device, with all the IPsec gateways connected in a mesh topology
[62]. Their graphical interpretation of this model is given in Fig. 2.7.
In case of Hub-and-Spoke IPsecVPN, they envision a model where all the
private networks connect via IPsec to a central IPsec gateway called the Hub,
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Figure 2.7: Architecture of the Full-Mesh IPsecVPN, where each IPsec gateway
(GW) of a private network (NW) is connected to all the other gateways [89].
and all communication between any of the private networks is relayed through
the Hub. Their graphical interpretation of this model is given in Fig. 2.8.
Figure 2.8: Architecture of the Hub-and-Spoke IPsecVPN, where each IPsec
gateway (GW) of a private network (NW) is connected only to the Hub gateway
(Hub-GW) [89].
The authors then go on to elaborate the limitations of these architectures. In
the case of the Full-Mesh IPsecVPN, they discuss the difficulty of dealing with
scalability issues related to policy management on the IPsec gateways as the
number of private networks increases. In the same vein, it will be difficult to add
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new private networks in an existing group seamlessly, as this will require adding
new policy in each IPsec gateway. In the case of the Hub-and-Spoke IPsecVPN,
they mention the problem of increased load on the Hub gateway as the traffic
between the private networks increases. The Hub gateway is also a single point-
of-failure in this model.
To address these concerns, they propose a hybrid model which is a modifica-
tion of the Hub-and-Spoke IPsecVPN, whose architecture is shown in Fig. 2.9. In
this model, they address the load management problem of the Hub-and-Spoke
by using the IKEv2 (Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2) Mobility and Multi-
homing Protocol (MOBIKE). The authors use MOBIKE as a load balancing tool for
their Hub gateway and in case of additional network traffic, they propose to recon-
figure the system so that the problem IPsec gateways are able to communicate
to each other directly without using the Hub gateway as a relay.
Figure 2.9: Architecture of the hybrid IPsec-VPN model, where the Hub gateway
(Hub-GW) is extended using the MOBIKE or Traffic Selector extension in order to
perform load-balancing operations [89].
The authors have not implemented or simulated this architecture, so we can-
not make use of any network performance results of this solution.
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Gaps and Limitations:
The main purpose of the MOBIKE extension is to enable a remote access VPN
user to move from one IP address to another, without re-establishing all the se-
curity associations with the IPsec gateway. The MOBIKE extension updates only
the outer (tunnel header) addresses of IPsec Security Associations (SA), the ad-
dresses and other traffic selectors that are in use inside the tunnel stay the same.
In this way the mobility of the user is invisible to the applications using the VPN.
Although the authors claim that this extension to the IPsec protocol can be
utilised for its unintended use as a load-balancer, they do not mention how they
detect or identify the problem traffic in the first place. Furthermore, there is still the
issue of the Hub gateway still being a single point-of-failure for this architecture,
an issue that is not addressed by the MOBIKE extension.
2.4.3 Connectivity as a Service (CaaS)
Connectivity as a Service (CaaS) for intra-cloud and inter-cloud communications
[40] is a research effort that aims to offer secure communication in a cloud-
based collaborative environment. They propose and implement an Electronic
Contract (e-Contract) based solution for intra-cloud and inter-cloud communica-
tion between organisation involved in Business-to-Business (B2B) collaboration
[77]. The main idea is to offer this solution as a trusted 3rd party web service to
the collaborating parties.
The graphical depiction of their architecture is given in Fig. 2.10. The collab-
orating organisations A, B and C reside within their administrative domains. In
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Figure 2.10: Architecture of the eContract-based secure intra-cloud and inter-
cloud connectivity service. The figure shows two extranets formed by the Con-
nectivity Service that offer services from both Cloud I and Cloud II [40]
order to collaborate, an e-Contract is negotiated among the organisations and
signed by each collaborator. The connectivity web service can then configure
and form an extranet, according to the e-Contract’s specifications. After the suc-
cessful formation of the extranet, the services deployed by the organisations can
communication with each other within the extranet. The extranet itself is a Open-
VPN based VPN link between specified VMs of the collaborating organisations.
39
2. Review of Related Work
The authors have conducted experimental evaluation of the performance cost
of their architecture in both intra-cloud and inter-cloud environments. For the intra-
cloud performance evaluation, they ran tests on three VMs hosted in Amazon EC2
[7] and measured the observed differences in latency and throughput between the
VMs in the same extranet. They noted an overhead of 100% in both latency and
throughput when using their solution as opposed to insecure communication.
Figure 2.11: Performance of the eContract-based secure inter-cloud connectivity
service in terms of effect on latency and throughput. compared in the presence
and absence of OpenVPN tunnels [40].
For the inter-cloud performance evaluation, they ran data transfer tests be-
tween two machines running on different LANs. Their comparison of the laten-
cies and throughputs of the two set of tests is shown in Fig. 2.11. They observed
that the performance cost of using their solution for inter-cloud communication is
much higher, i.e., ranging from 300% for small sized data (1 KB) to 135% for large
sized data (1 GB).
Gaps and Limitations:
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The authors have based the security and architecture of the secure communi-
cation aspect of the their solution on OpenVPN [167]. Hence they suffer from
its inherent drawback as discussed earlier in this chapter, i.e., a single point-of-
failure. Furthermore, they don’t address the issue of distributing keys or other
authentication credentials that is required for ensuring the security of the commu-
nication channels. In the same vein, they also don’t mention how they map the
actual machines that form the extranet, to their web based 3rd party connectivity
service.
Lastly, the latency overheads of more than 100% in case of intra-cloud com-
munication, and more than 300% in case of inter-cloud communication, make
their solution extremely undesirable for most cloud-based network applications.
In case of most B2B applications, which is their target category of applications,
this much overhead will cause an unacceptable increase in time required to send
and receive business transactions.
2.4.4 Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC)
Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) is a cloud based VPN solution pro-
vided by Amazon that lets its customers provision a logically isolated section of
the Amazon cloud as a virtual network to its customers. The customers control
and manage their virtual networking environment, including the selection of IP
address ranges, creation of subnets, and configuration of routing tables and net-
work gateways. The customers can leverage certain security features provided
by the Amazon VPC, like security groups and network access control lists, to help
control network access to Amazon EC2 instances in each subnet. In addition to
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this, customers can create VPN connections between their local network and the
Amazon VPC by using a hardware VPN device hosted by Amazon and bridging
it with a hardware VPN device installed in their local network. The logical view of
an Amazon VPC deployment is shown in Fig. 2.12.
Figure 2.12: Architecture of an Amazon VPC deployment. Access to the EC2
instances in Zones A and B is provided through a Virtual Private Gateway (VPG),
which acts as the end-point of the VPN between the customer gateway and the
Amazon cloud [6]
2.4.5 Google Secure Data Connector
Google Secure Data Connector (SDC) is a client-side tool that lets its users es-
tablish an encrypted connection between their local network and Google tunnel
servers. The Google tunnel servers are also used to validate whether a user is
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authorized to request access to the specified resources hosted on the Google
cloud. After the user validation, the tunnelling protocol allows SDC to connect to
a Google tunnel server, authenticate, and encrypt the traffic that flows between
the user’s network and the Google cloud.
Figure 2.13: Architectural view of Google Secure Data Connector. The VPN
is established between the Tunnel Servers hosted on Google premises and the
Secure Data Connector hosted on the customer network [71]
2.4.6 CohsiveFT VPN-Cubed
CohsiveFT VPN-Cubed is a virtualised network appliance that is hosted on third-
party cloud services and acts as a a router, firewall, and VPN concentrator. Its
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main difference from the previous two products is that it lets its customers extend
their VPN across multiple public and private clouds to create one logical group of
federated resources. It also provides the capability of forming encrypted tunnels
using IPsec to secure all traffic coming to and from its virtual appliances. Similar
to the previous two examples, users can extend their local network into the feder-
ated VPN using dedicated hardware IPsec devices on their premises.
Figure 2.14: A multi-cloud deployment scenario in VPN-Cubed®. In this deploy-
ment, three VNS3 Manager servers are hosted on three different cloud regions
but only one of them (VNS3 Manager 2) is acting as the IPsec gateway for the
IPsec devices of the customer data centers [47]
Gaps and Limitations:
Although these products allow the possibility to leverage the cloud providers’
APIs to flexibly grow and shrink their networks, the management and configu-
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ration is as complex as a traditional network as components of the VPC such as
internet gateways, VPN servers, NAT instances and subnets have to be managed
by the customers themselves.
Furthermore, the customers are required to set up an IPsec device on their
premises that connects to an IPsec gateway in the VPC running as a virtual appli-
ance which integrates the enterprise’s network with the VPC subnet in the cloud.
Most importantly, with the exception of [47], these solutions are locked to single
cloud vendor and [47] provides use of a selective set of cloud providers by placing
its virtual appliances as VPN gateways in these cloud infrastructures and allowing
the customers to join these gateways in a mesh topology manually.
2.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have reviewed the existing solutions that can be used to set up
secure communication links between multiple parties. We have explained their
architecture in detail so that its easy to see whether these solutions can be used
in an inter-cloud environment. We have also discussed the deployment models
utilised by these solutions as the ease and automation of deployment of a secure
communication solution in the cloud ecosystem is one of our main objectives.
Therefore, we have focused on four classes of deployment strategies, that is,
client-server, virtual network, peer-to-peer, and cloud computing.
For the client-server model, we have highlighted that although its administra-
tion is simple due to the inherent centralised control, it is also its biggest limitation
from the point-of-view of scalability. Therefore, it becomes difficult to manage as
the number of parties participating in the VPN increase, and it also exposes a
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single point-of-failure.
For the virtual network model, we have shown that although these types of
solutions offer the flexibility of constructing highly customised networks, it incor-
porates an inherent management and administrative overhead into the system.
This is due to the fact that heavy customisation does not go hand-in-hand with
flexibility, therefore any change in configuration of the virtual networks becomes a
arduous manual task. This problem only increases in magnitude as the number of
members of such a system increases, thus effecting the scalability of the solution
as well.
For the peer-to-peer (P2P) model, we have highlighted that although the basic
approach of using P2P technology is sound, the two solutions incur overheads
with respect to scalability and ease of administration and management. This is
basically due to the way they structure their topologies, forming a mesh network
in one case and assuming a fixed and static peer membership in the other. This
makes scalability an issue for the former solution, and peer churn comes in as a
problem for the later.
For the cloud based model, we have discussed three popular commercial so-
lutions. These solutions have the advantage of being designed specifically for the
cloud environment, therefore scalability and ease of deployment is usually not an
issue for them. However, some of these give us the problem of vendor-lock-in as
they are tailor made for a specific cloud platform. Furthermore, they almost do
nothing to make it easy to manage and configure the network elements of their
solutions, which are usually left for the customers to administer as they would a
traditional network infrastructure.
In the next chapter, we discuss a collection of methods and techniques that we
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believe can be utilised to design a secure communication framework according to
our objectives. We will elaborate in detail techniques concerning de-centralised
control, network tunnelling, key distribution and functional encryption. This will
give the reader ability to better understand the motivation for the design of differ-




In the previous chapter we have identified the gaps in the existing research do-
main that we want to fill with our research efforts by building on the state-of-the-
art research currently available in security engineering methodologies. As men-
tioned previously, the main difference between existing work and our research
effort is that the existing work predominantly focuses on providing remote ac-
cess to users over wide-area networks or single/tightly-integrated cloud service
providers, whereas our research effort aims towards a scalable communication
framework that enables the provisioning of secure virtual private networks in a
generic multi-cloud environment.
In order to achieve this aim, we have detailed the core requirements earlier in
Section 1.4 and Chapter 2, which need to be fulfilled by our research process to
come up with the design and architecture of an inter-cloud secure communication
framework. A summarised and consolidated list of important characteristics and




• Decentralised and scalable architecture.
• Efficient data and configuration management.
• Low communication and performance overheads.
• Secure and strong access control.
• Decentralised and scalable key distribution.
• Efficient and low-overhead encryption techniques.
In order to cater for these characteristics and features, we evaluated a large
number of mechanisms and techniques that we identified as being relevant to our
stated aims. Of these, we highlight a non-exhaustive selection of the techniques
and mechanisms, which according to our reviews can contribute directly towards
the achievement of our research goals. Therefore, to address the issues of con-
structing the base of a decentralised and scalable communication framework in
which the number of communicating entities can increase or decrease dynami-
cally we study and analyse peer-to-peer overlays. To cater for the efficient data
and configuration management concerns in a widely distributed environment we
look into distributed data structures like the Distributed Hash Table.
To focus on the low communication and performance overheads for our se-
cure communication framework we investigate these overheads for all the com-
ponents of the framework, specifically for tunnelling protocols, as almost all of the
research efforts in the related work have focused on using application layer pro-
tocols for this purpose whereas in our opinion network layer protocols like IPsec
will offer better performance and reduced communication overheads, although at
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the cost of added complexity in terms of configuration management. However,
these added costs can also be mitigated in our research approach by utilising the
distributed data structures for efficiently sharing and enforcing the IPsec related
configurations. To address the challenges of secure access control and decen-
tralised and scalable key distribution in a multi-cloud environment, we investigate
the suitable techniques of key exchanges and key agreements. And lastly, to keep
the overheads of core encryption mechanisms low, we try to avoid the traditional
symmetric and asymmetric techniques and analyse the functional encryption ap-
proach and its variants.
In the upcoming sections in this chapter, we describe in detail the discerning
aspects of these mechanisms and techniques that are beneficial to our goals
and form the foundations of our further research contributions. We also highlight
when, how and where we make use of these mechanisms and techniques to fulfil
our research requirements.
3.1 Peer-to-Peer Overlays
An overlay network can be seen as a network of virtual or logical links and con-
nections that exists on top of another network. As any other computer network,
the main purpose of an overlay network is to facilitate the sharing of resources
between the nodes comprising of that overlay, but at a higher level of abstrac-
tion than the more traditional computer networks. This higher abstraction level
has proven to be quite useful in providing features like scalable and robust wide-
area routing, efficient network-wide search of data and resources, discovery of
nearby nodes, redundant and scalable data storage, anonymity and privacy, and
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extensive scalability and fault tolerance [9].
Peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay networks are a type of distributed systems of re-
source sharing nodes. But instead of conforming to a client-server model in
which client nodes act as consumers of resources and centralised server nodes
act as the producers of resources, all the nodes in a P2P overlay share the re-
sources among themselves and can act simultaneously both as the consumer
and provider of resources.
Figure 3.1: An abstract P2P overlay network architecture from [110]
P2P overlays have been used very successfully in a wide range of application
domains, over a large spectrum of communication frameworks like telecommuni-
cation networks and the world wide web [24]. However, the overall architectural
model of a P2P overlay remains quite consistent despite this vast range and is
discussed in some detail in [110] and depicted in Fig. 3.1, showing typical com-
ponents of a P2P overlay. A brief description is as follows:-
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• The Network Communications layer addresses the network characteristics
like connectivity over the Internet or any other communication infrastructure.
• The Overlay Nodes Management layer handles the management of peer
nodes, which typically includes peer/neighbour-node discovery and P2P
routing algorithms.
• The Features Management layer addresses the issues related to security,
reliability, and fault tolerance of the P2P overlays.
• The Services Specific layer deals with the application-specific components
present in the lower layers of the model, typically relating to task scheduling,
content and file management etc.
• The Application-level layer deals with the applications and services which
make use of the underlying P2P overlay model layers for their advantage.
Depending on how the nodes in peer-to-peer overlay networks are linked to
each other, we can categorize the P2P networks as either structured or unstruc-
tured. A structured peer-to-peer network uses a globally consistent protocol to
make sure that any peer node can efficiently route a search to some other peer
node that has the resource required by that node. In order to achieve this effi-
ciency the peers are organized and managed by following a specific set of rules
and algorithms. This in turn leads to overlays with specific topologies and prop-
erties.
An unstructured peer-to-peer network, on the other hand, does not follow any
rules to ensure any kind of structure in its consistency and are completely decen-
tralized, at least in theory because in practice most implementations do use some
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level of centralization. Their main advantage is that the overlay can be easily con-
structed as a new peer that wants to join the overlay network can copy existing
links of another peer and then form its own links over time. However, on the down
side, if a peer wants to find a resource in the overlay, its request has to be flooded
through the network to find as many peers as possible that have that resource.
Moreover, there is a possibility, albeit very small, that the queries may never be
resolved.
To meet the requirements of our research effort, we investigate the inner work-
ing of a structured peer-to-peer overlay network known as Kademlia [114] in more
detail in the next section. This peer-to-peer overlay has the added advantage of
supporting distributed hash table for information exchange between the different
peer nodes of the overlay. This gives us the capability of addressing the de-
centralisation and scalability problem space as well as the provisioning of a core
mechanism that we can build on further for the purposes of efficient data and
configuration management of the secure communication framework.
3.2 Distributed Hash Tables
Most structured P2P networks make use of a data structure known as a Dis-
tributed Hash Table (DHT), which provides the same service as a traditional hash
table but in it the responsibility for maintaining the mapping from keys to values is
distributed among different nodes i.e., instead of mapping each key to a particular
array slot, as done in a hash table, the distributed hash tables maps each key to
a particular node or peer. More specifically, it employs a keyspace partitioning
scheme that splits the ownership of an abstract keyspace (for example a set of
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160-bit strings) among the participating nodes. An overlay network can connect
these nodes and allows them to find the owner of any given key in the keyspace.
Figure 3.2: An operational description of a distributed hash table [162]
Structured peer-to-peer overlay networks based on DHT support the scalable
storage and retrieval of key, value pairs on the overlay network which is very
helpful when we need to store and retrieve meta-data related to the virtual private
network management. Given a (key, value) pair, a store operation put(key,value)
can be invoked to store the marshalled data objects corresponding to the value on
the P2P overlay. Similarly, given a key, a retrieval operation value=get(key) can be
invoked to obtain the data object corresponding to the key from the P2P overlay.
Each peer node maintains a small routing table containing the Peer ID (IDenti-
fier) and the IP addresses of the neighbouring peer nodes. Different structured
peer-to-peer overlay systems based on distributed hash tables systems have dif-
ferent naming, management, and organisation schemes for their data objects,
key space, and routing algorithms. In theory, DHT-based systems can guarantee
that, on average, any data object can be located with-in O(log N) overlay hops,
where N is the number of peer nodes in the overlay. Existing structured peer-
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to-peer overlay systems like Chord [145], Pastry [135] and Tapestry [170] have
been widely used to provide scalable and fast information storage and retrieval
services for a vast variety of applications. We have leveraged the Kademlia al-
gorithm [114] to cater for the storage and retrieval requirements of our problem
space.
Kademlia works by assigning each peer node a node-identification number
called Peer ID in a 160-bit key space. Its discerning DHT storage principle is that
the key, value pairs are stored on peers with Peer IDs closest to the key, which
is also a 160-bit number. A Peer ID based routing algorithm is used to locate
peers near a destination key and guarantees that on average, any data object
can be located in O(logN) peer hops, N being the number of peers in the overlay.
Kademlia uses a novel Exclusive OR (XOR) metric for distance between points
in the key space, as XOR is symmetric and it allows the peer nodes to receive
lookup queries from the same distribution of peer nodes which are present in their
routing tables. This is because every time a message is sent by a peer node, it
includes its Peer ID, allowing the receiving peer node to record the sender peers
Peer ID and IP address etc. in its routing table.
To locate the key, value pairs, Kademlia utilises the notion of distance between
two Peer IDs. For two 160-bit Peer IDs, a and b, the distance between them is
defined as their bit-wise Exclusive OR, i.e., ∀a, b
a⊕ b = b⊕ a,
a⊕ b = 0, and
a⊕ b > 0 (if a ≠ b).
XOR also offers the triangle inequality property, i.e., ∀a, b
(a⊕ b) + (b⊕ c) ≥ a⊕ c
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∵ a⊕ c = (a⊕ b) ⊕ (b⊕ c) and a + b ≥ a⊕ b ∀a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0.
Furthermore, XOR is uni-directional, that is, for any given point x and distance
∆ > 0, there is exactly one point y such that x⊕y =∆. This uni-directional property
makes sure that all lookup operations for the same key converge along the same
overlay route, regardless of the starting peer location. This improves the lookup
operation performance as caching the key, value pairs along the lookup overlay
route alleviates hot spots.
All peer nodes in the overlay network store a list of IP address, Port No., Peer
ID triples for the peers having the distances between 2i and 2i+1 from themselves.
These lists are called k-buckets. Each k -bucket is sorted by last time seen, with
the least recently accessed peer at the head of the list and the most-recently
accessed at the tail of the list. For small values of i, the k -buckets will be usually
empty as most probably no appropriate peer node will exist, whereas for large
values of i the list can grow up to the value of k. The k is a system-wide replication
parameter and is chosen empirically such that the probability of any given k nodes
failing within an hour of each other is minuscule.
The Kademlia routing protocol consists of four operations: PING , STORE,
FIND NODE, and FIND VALUE.
1. PING pings a peer node to check if it is online.
2. STORE instructs a peer node to store a key, value pair.
3. FIND NODE takes a 160-bit ID as input and returns IP address, Port No.,
Peer ID triples for the k peers it knows about that are closest to the input ID.
4. FIND VALUE is similar to FIND NODE, in that it returns IP address, port
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No., Peer ID triples, except in the case when a peer has received a STORE
for the key, in which case it just returns the stored value.
One of the most important operations that a Kademlia peer performs is to lo-
cate the k closest peers to a given Peer ID. This lookup operation starts by pick-
ing α peer nodes from its closest non-empty k -bucket, and then sending parallel
asynchronous FIND NODE requests to those α peers, where α is a pre-chosen
system-wide concurrency parameter. If the FIND NODE request fails to return a
peer node that is closer than the peers already seen, it resends the FIND NODE
request to all of the k closest peers it has not already queried. To find a key, value
pair, a peer starts by performing a FIND VALUE lookup to find the k peers nodes
with Peer IDs closest to the key and halts immediately when any node returns the
value.
To join the network, a peer A must contact an already participating peer B.
Peer A inserts peer B into the appropriate k -bucket, and then performs a peer
lookup for its own Peer ID. Finally, peer A refreshes all k -buckets farther away
than its closest neighbour, and during these refreshes it populates its own k -
buckets and adds itself into other peers k -buckets as required.
3.3 IPsec
IPsec, short for Internet Protocol Security [55], is an end-to-end protocol suite
based on an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards [15]. It is used
for securing IP layer communication by authenticating and encrypting each IP
packet of a communication session. IPsec consists of a set of protocols for nego-
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tiation of cryptographic parameters and keys to be used during a communication
session and establishing a mutually authenticated session between the commu-
nicating hosts. IPsec can be used to secure the IP traffic between a pair of hosts
(host-to-host), between a pair of network gateways/router (network-to-network),
or between a network gateway/router and a host (network-to-host) [35]. One of
the main advantages of IPsec is that as it operates on the Network Layer of the
TCP/IP model, applications do not need to be redesigned in order to use it rather
it is transparent to most of the application protocols using it. Another advantage
of IPsec is that it is currently supported and implemented in almost all operating
systems kernels.
IPsec can operate in two modes:
• Transport Mode
• Tunnel Mode
Transport Mode is used to protect end-to-end communication between two
hosts. In this mode, only the IP packet payload is encrypted and/or authenticated.
The routing behaviour of the packet remains intact as the IP header is neither
modified nor encrypted. However, if the Authentication Header is used, the IP
addresses cannot be modified as this will invalidate the hash value. Therefore,
Authentication Header is incompatible with NAT (Network Address Translation).
Tunnel Mode is used to encapsulate IP packets inside another IP packet and
sent to the destination. In this mode, the entire IP packet is encrypted and/or
authenticated and then encapsulated into a new IP packet with a new IP header.
This mode is used to create virtual private networks by allowing the formation of
tunnels between two hosts. As this mode encapsulates the complete IP header
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as well as the payload, it allows the source and destination IP addresses to be
different from those of the encompassing packet and hence support NAT traver-
sal.
IPsec mainly uses two sub-protocols to perform its security operations:-
• Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)
• Authentication Header (AH)
Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) protocol protects the IP packet data
from malicious third party attacks by encrypting its contents using symmetric
cryptography algorithms such as 3DES (Triple Data Encryption Standard) [18]
and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) [1]. It also provides the security ser-
vices of authentication and integrity for the IP packets.
Authentication Header (AH) protocols provides authentication and integrity
protection for the IP packets. It can also protect against replay attacks, in which
the attackers can capture packets during transmission and attempt to re-inject
them back onto the transmission at a later time. It operates by computing a cryp-
tographic hash-based Integrity Check Value (ICV) over all the fields of a IP packet,
except the ones which are modified during transit, for example the TTL (Time-To-
Live) and the IP checksum etc. It stores this ICV in a newly-added AH header
along with some other parameters and sent to the receiving host.
IPsec uses Security Associations (SA) to establish and share security at-
tributes between hosts that want to secure their communication using either AH
or ESP. An SA includes attributes like cryptographic algorithms, IPsec mode, en-
cryption keys, and other network parameters. The framework for establishing se-
curity associations is provided by the Internet Security Association and Key Man-
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agement Protocol (ISAKMP). Security Associations are stored inside a Security
Association Database (SADB) in each host. Upon receiving an IP packet secured
using IPsec, three fields are used to locate the correct SA from the SADB, which
are the sender’s IP address, IPsec Protocol (ESP or AH), and the Security Pa-
rameters Index (SPI). A similar operation is performed when sending an IP packet
using IPsec.
To meet the requirements of our research effort, we make use of the IPsec
protocol suite instead of the more commonly used OpenVPN. This is done in light
of the above background as well as the comparison studies between the two like
[99], which evaluate IPsec as the better choice in terms of throughput and latency
performance results. This better performance is due to IPsec being implemented
in the kernel space, as opposed to the user space implementation of OpenVPN
on most operating systems, as well as because of location of the IPsec in layer 3
of the TCP/IP model as opposed to the layer 5 location of OpenVPN.
3.4 Internet Key Exchange
As described in the previous section, IPsec can be used to provide confidentiality,
integrity, and source authentication for IP packets transmitted from a source to a
destination. These security services are provided by sharing some meta-data and
security parameters between the IP source and destination. This include the type
of security services provided (AH or ESP), the possible cryptographic algorithms
that will be used to provide the security services, and the encryption/decryption
keys. The IPsec protocol suite itself does not contain features of sharing this
required meta-data and security parameters automatically and efficiently between
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the IP source and destination, and it especially becomes cumbersome as the
number of hosts that want to use IPsec for secure communication increases.
This is where Internet Key Exchange (IKE [76] or IKEv2 [95]) comes in, which is
a protocol that can be used to solve this problem, at least partially, by helping to
set up a shared session secret between the two hosts. The relationship between






























Figure 3.3: Architecture of the IPsec and IKE protocols
The IKE protocol starts by performing mutual authentication between the two
hosts who want to secure their communication using IPsec. It then establishes an
Security Association (SA) that includes security meta-data and parameters that
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can be used to establish SAs for Authentication Header (AH) or Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) and a set of cryptographic algorithms that are to be used
by the SAs to encrypt and secure the traffic. The same functions are performed
on the other end of the connection as well and a common set of cryptographic
algorithms to be used between the hosts is negotiated and agreed upon. Af-
ter the IKE protocol has completed its operations, the IPsec stack on the hosts
machines has the required information needed to start the actual secure trans-
mission of data. This information required by IPsec is parameters like an AES
key, IP addresses of the source and the destination, TCP or UDP ports of appli-
cation layer protocols that are to be protected, and the type of IPsec tunnel that
is to be created.
The IKE protocol is generally supported in most of the operating systems that
support IPsec. The latest versions of the Microsoft Windows operating systems
fully support the IKEv2 protocol, where as almost all major distributions of Linux-
based operating systems support different open source implementations of IKEv2
as well.
3.5 Key Agreement Protocols
In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman came up with an algorithm that allows
two parties to agree on a shared secret key over an insecure communications
channel, without having any prior knowledge of each other [52]. This algorithm is
now known as Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange and is widely used for the pur-
pose of key agreement. The basic steps for reaching the key agreement between
two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, are as follows:-
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• Alice and Bob agree on a finite cyclic group G and a generating element
g ∈ G
• Alice picks a random natural number a and sends ga (mod p) to Bob
• Bob also picks a random natural number b and sends gb (mod p) to Alice
• Alice calculates the key K = (gb)a (mod p) = gab (mod p)
• Bob calculates the key K = (ga)b (mod p) = gab (mod p)
Only values of a and b need to be private in order to secure the key agreement
protocol against a passive eavesdropper. In order to compromise the system, a
passive attacker will have to find the value of gab (mod p), given the generator
g, modulus p, and the values of ga (mod p) and gb (mod p). This is known as
the Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) and is considered to be a hard problem for the
recommended generators and modulus values.
However, Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange is vulnerable to an active attacker as
it does not offer any authentication of the communicating parties. Thus, a Man-
in-the-Middle (MitM) attack is possible where the attacker can establish two dif-
ferent DH key exchanges with Alice and Bob, effectively appearing as Alice to
Bob, and vice versa. This will allow the attacker to to decrypt, then re-encrypt,
the messages passed between Alice and Bob without them noticing anything.
To safeguard Diffie-Hellman against an active attacker, we can use some of its
authenticated variants like MQV (Menezes-Qu-Vanstone) [101]. MQV is an au-
thenticated key exchange protocol, that is, it tries to combine key exchange with
a mutual authentication of both communicating parties.
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All of the following operations use a finite cyclic group G of prime order q and
a generating element g ∈ G. We use ∣q∣ as the bit length of q, that is, ∣q∣ = ⌈log
2
q⌉.
So ℓ = ∣q∣ /2 .
The basic steps for reaching the key agreement between two communicating
parties, Alice and Bob, are as follows:-
• Alice has a long term private key a ∈ Zq with corresponding public key A = ga;
similarly Bob has a key pair (B, b)
• Alice picks a random number x and calculates X = gx; similarly Bob picks y
and Y = gy
• Alice calculates d = X = 2ℓ + (X mod 2ℓ); similarly Bob calculates e = Y =
2ℓ + (Y mod 2ℓ)
• Alice sends X and Ad to Bob; similarly Bob sends Y and Be to Alice
• Alice computes σA = (Y ⋅Be)x+ad
• Bob computes σB = (X ⋅Ad)y+be
So both Alice and Bob get to the same authenticated session keyK = σA = σB.
σA = σB
(Y ⋅Be)x+ad = (X ⋅Ad)y+be
(Y ⋅BY )x+aX = (X ⋅AX)y+bY
(gy ⋅ gbY )x+aX = (gx ⋅ gaX)y+bY
(gy + bY )x+aX = (gx + aX)y+bY (3.1)
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MQV is an authenticated key exchange in that it tries to combine the key ex-
change with a mutual authentication of both involved parties. However, this does
not map well to existing communication frameworks, in particular SSL. In SSL, the
client and server have distinct roles; the client gains assurance that it knows the
correct server public key through the server’s certificate, but the authentication
of the client, when applied at all, is separated from the key exchange (the client
computes a signature with its private key, and the algorithm for that signature
needs not be related to the one used for the key exchange).
Another viewpoint on the subject is that if a putative SSL client has a certifi-
cate with a MQV public key (assuming that use of MQV with SSL was formalized
and implemented), then the client can use that certificate only to authenticate with
SSL servers who uses MQV and happen to have a MQV key pair which uses the
same elliptic curve. This is rather restrictive, and contrasts with the usual situation
where the client has a generic signature certificate which can be used in many
other contexts. As the purpose of a secure and authenticated key exchange pro-
tocol is directly related to our research requirements, we discuss the modification
of this protocol as part of our research effort in detail later in Chapter 5.
3.6 Functional Cryptography
Encryption is a well known and established technique for securely sharing data
between users and processes over insecure or untrusted networks and storage
mediums. Traditionally it had been done with the help of a secret key that was
shared priori between two or more parties that wanted to share data with con-
fidentiality. There exists a large class of algorithms in literature that uses this
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traditional primitive, where usually the same key is used for both the encryption
and decryption process, known as Symmetric Encryption [63]. Some examples
of popular symmetric encryption techniques are Twofish [139], Serpent [10], AES
[1], Blowfish [138], RC4 [63], 3DES [63], and IDEA [137].
However, while these symmetric encryption techniques might be acceptable
for a small and cohesive set of users, they were clearly infeasible for larger net-
works such as Internet, which may consist of millions of users. So about thirty
years ago, a radically new encryption method was invented in the form of public
key cryptography [52], where two or more parties can securely communicate with
each other without having to agree to a priori mutually shared secret. Now-a-
days, the use of this public key encryption or asymmetric encryption is ubiquitous
in all sort of communication networks, from secure web communication to disk
encryption.
However, for some emerging domains, like our focus area the inter-cloud com-
munication, this notion of public key encryption is insufficient. This is mainly due
to the inherent lack of access granularity of the public key encryption techniques,
i.e., a user can either decrypt and access the entire message or he learns nothing
at all about the message, other than perhaps its length. In most modern cloud
services, it is often desirable to associate a decryption policy with the encrypted
message and only the users who can satisfy the policy being able to decrypt the
message. In more generic terms, we want to be able to only give access to a
function of the plaintext message to an authorised user. Public key cryptography
is not really helpful in this types of scenarios and this is where functional encryp-
tion comes in. We discuss the secure formulation of a secure resource discovery
protocol as part of our research effort in detail later in Chapter 6 which uses differ-
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ent variants of the functional encryption scheme described briefly in this section
below.
Table 3.1: Primitives of Functional Encryption
Sequence Explanation
setup(1)→ (pp,msk) Generate a public and master secret key pair
keygen(mk,k)→ sk Generate secret key for k
enc(pp, x)→ c Encrypt message x
dec(sk, c)→ y Use sk to decrypt c
In a generic functional encryption scheme, a decryption key describes a func-
tion of the encrypted data to the user. This function F (⋅, ⋅) is modelled as a Turing
Machine [155] and an authority possessing a master secret key (msk ) can gener-
ate a key skk that can be used to compute the function F (k, ⋅) on some encrypted
data.
To describe it more formally but briefly, a functional encryption scheme (FE)
for a functionality F defined over (K, X) is a sequence of four algorithms (setup,
keygen, encryption, decryption), as given in Table 3.1. These must satisfy the
correctness condition y = F (k, x) with the probability 1, for all k ∈ K and x ∈ X.
The set K is called the key space and the set X is called the plaintext space.
The functional encryption technique also requires that the key space K contain a
special key called the empty key ǫ.
The empty key ǫ in K gathers all the information about the plaintext that inten-
tionally leaks from the ciphertext, such as the length of the encrypted message.
Therefore, anyone is able to apply dec(ǫ, c) on a ciphertext enc(pp, x)
R
→ c and get
all the information about x that intentionally leaks from c.
Another advantage of functional encryption is that many encryption concepts
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and constructions can be viewed as special cases of functional encryption. For
example, we can show that public key encryption is a simple example of functional
encryption. Let K ∶= 1, ǫ and consider the following functionality F defined over
(K;X) for some plaintext space X:




x if k = 1
len(x) if k = ǫ
(3.2)
A secret key for k = 1 decrypts the valid ciphertexts, while the empty key
k = ǫ simply returns the length of the plaintext message. Hence, this functionality
syntactically defines the standard public key encryption method.
Identity-Based Encryption [141], [30], [45], Predicate Encryption [31] and Attribute-
Based Encryption [80] are some examples of sub-classes of functional encryp-
tion. We show by giving a few examples that how functional encryption captures
these encryption concepts.
3.6.1 Predicate Encryption
In many peer-to-peer applications, a plaintext message x ∈ X is usually a key-
value pair (ind, m) ∈ I ×M where ind is the index of the pair, m is the payload
message, I is the index space, andM is the payload message space. For exam-
ple, in an email message, the index will be usually set as the sender’s name or
email address while the payload might be the contents of the email message.
In this context, the Functional Encryption functionality in terms of a polynomial-
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time predicate P ∶K × I → {0,1} over (K ∪ {ǫ}, (I ×M)) is defined as,




m if P (k, ind) = 1, and
 if P (k, ind) = 0
(3.3)
Now, let c be an encryption of (ind, m) and let skk be a secret key for k ∈
K. Then, the function dec(skk, c) will decrypt the message payload in c when
P (k, ind) = 1 but will reveal nothing new about m otherwise.
3.6.2 Identity-based Encryption
An Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme is an encryption scheme where any
arbitrary string can be a valid public key. For example, email addresses and dates
etc. can also be public keys. Its main advantage is that communicating parties
may encrypt messages and verify signatures with no prior distribution of keys
required between individual participants. This is obviously very useful in a lot of
cases where distribution of authenticated keys is inconvenient or impractical due
to technical or administrative constraints.
Identity-Based Encryption can be formally described as a Predicate Encryp-
tion scheme where :
• The key space is K ∶= {0, 1}∗ ⋃ {ǫ}
• The plaintext is a pair (ind, m) where the index space I ∶= {0, 1}∗
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• The predicate P on K × I is defined as,




1 if k = ind, and
0 otherwise
(3.4)
For these Identity-Based Encryption systems to properly support the empty
key ǫ functionality, the ciphertext must explicitly include the ind and the length of
the message len(m) in the clear.
3.6.3 Attribute-Based Encryption
An Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) scheme is an encryption scheme where the
secret key of a user and the ciphertext are dependent upon attributes that the user
possesses. Due to this, the decryption of a ciphertext is possible only if the set of
attributes of the user key matches the attributes of the ciphertext. Subsequently,
this makes it possible to express complex access policies using these attributes.
The Attribute-Based Encryption concept has been refined into two types: Key-
Policy ABE and Ciphertext Policy ABE.
In Key-Policy ABE, the attributes are assigned to a ciphertext when that ci-
phertext is created. The policies are assigned to users and keys by an authority,
which is usually the same entity that creates the keys. A key can decrypt only
those ciphertexts whose attributes satisfy the assigned policy.
In Ciphertext Policy ABE, the users of the system are assigned certain at-
tributes. The users then receive a key from an authority for their set of attributes.
A policy is associated with the ciphertext at the time of encryption. If a user’s
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attribute set satisfies the policy, he can use his key to decrypt the ciphertext.
3.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we give a detailed explanation of methods and techniques that we
have researched and selected for utilisation in our secure communication frame-
work. We have included the techniques that will help us in achieving our research
objectives, as stated in Chapter 1. Some of these methods and techniques will
form the core of some of the components of our solution, so we have described
them in detail and focused on the aspects that make them suitable for our use.
We started by describing the peer-to-peer overlays and their types, as these
form the basis of the architecture of our framework. A structured peer-to-peer
overlay will be the foundation of our approach to address the issues regarding the
inter-cloud nature of our target environment. Therefore, we describe the specific
peer-to-peer protocol that we will use in our implementation in some detail, i.e.,
Kademlia. We focused on its efficient storage and retrieval aspects using the dis-
tributed hash table data structure, as well as the node joining and peer discovery
mechanisms.
We also described the IPsec protocol suite in some detail, along with its dif-
ferent modes of operations. This is important as we use IPsec and its associated
technologies to provide the underlying confidentiality and integrity in the commu-
nications links established as a result of using our framework. We also described
the Internet Key Exchange protocol, which we don’t actually use in our solution,
but it acts as our motivation to provide the key distribution functionality between




We also described the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol that can be used
to generate the actual session keys that are required to perform the encryption
operations in IPsec. We described in detail one of its authenticated variant known
as MQV, which addresses the Man-in-the-Middle attacks that are possible in the
standard Diffie-Hellman scheme. This variant becomes our guiding motivation
with which we design a modified version of authenticated key generation and
exchange protocol for use in our solution.
Lastly, we described the concept of functional cryptography and some of its
types in some detail. This is attractive to us as it gives us the opportunity to
control the granularity of the decryption process by associating it with proving
the ownership of a predicate, attribute, or policy. This is especially useful in cloud
computing scenarios if we are able to share the security credentials efficiently and
securely, by ensuring that only an authorised user is able to access and decrypt
these security credentials and we can control the granularity of the authorisation.
In the next chapter, we highlight when, how and where we make use of these
mechanisms and techniques to construct our solution. We will see in detail how
these methods provide us with further advantages, in addition to the accomplish-
ment our main objectives. Furthermore, we will explain the methodology, tech-
niques and tools that we have used to implement the prototype of our model
framework and the various performance results that we have measured by de-




In the previous chapters we have identified the gaps in the existing research do-
main that we want to fill with the techniques and protocols developed as part of
our research efforts and by applying the applied security research methodologies.
In this respect, the main objectives of our research effort to design and architect
a secure communication framework that works efficiently in a inter-cloud environ-
ment are fourfold.
Firstly, to construct a scalable virtual private overlay network between virtual
machines deployed on multiple cloud platforms. The design of this overlay net-
work has to conform to the constraints and requirements detailed in the previ-
ous chapters. We also have to take into consideration that the number of virtual
machines can increase or decrease dynamically during the life-cycle of a cloud
application and that the overlay network also has to cater for this churn. However,
the triggering of this churn is currently external to our scope of research.
Secondly, to include a scalable key distribution mechanism as an integral part
of the framework, which will cater to the encryption and decryption-keys related
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requirements of the security mechanisms and protocols that will be needed to be
designed, implemented and evaluated as the core contributions of our research
effort.
Thirdly, to have a design that involves as minimal manual configuration man-
agement as possible in order to make the final solution very easy to deploy. This
is important also due to the fact that most of the existing cloud platforms require a
lot of manual effort to correctly set up and manage even a small or medium cloud
service. So when addressing service deployment and operation at an inter-cloud
level, maximum automation is a highly desirable and attractive prospect for any
cloud vendor.
Fourthly and lastly, we want to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the
communication as well as the sensitive data and meta-data that is exchanged
between different components of the communication framework.
In order to achieve these objectives, we have come up with a collection of
mechanisms and techniques that can be integrated to formulate an efficient and
scalable secure communication framework that is able to satisfy our research re-
quirements in an inter-cloud environment. In the coming sections we describe
in detail the peer-to-peer model architecture we have come up with in order to
address the inter-cloud nature of our target environment. Although the basic pur-
pose of its design is to handle the distributed and dynamic placement of the virtual
machines on multiple cloud providers, we will also elaborate how we have added
to a standard peer-to-peer design. These additions and modifications have pro-
vided us with further advantages to accomplish our research objectives. After
that we explain the methodology, techniques and tools that we have used to im-
plement the prototype of our model and the various performance results that we
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have measured by deploying and evaluating this prototype on one academic and
two commercial cloud platforms.
4.1 Design and Architecture
The design and architecture of our inter-cloud secure communication framework
is inspired by a collection of techniques like Virtual Private Networks [148] (VPN)
and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Overlays [9]. Network virtualization techniques like VPNs
and P2P Overlays have been shown to provide their users with legacy communi-
cation functionalities of their native network environments, despite the topology,
configuration and management architecture of the underlying physical network.
This fits perfectly with our goal of providing a secure virtual private network as a
service to the consumers operating on top of multiple cloud providers.
All the complications and complexities of managing a physical network are
abstracted by the overlay network, enabling the virtual machines deployed on
multiple clouds to benefit from a customised communication network typically only
available in physical local-area environments. However, there are some problems
in using the traditional designs and architectures of Virtual Private Networks and
Peer-to-Peer Overlays for our secure communication framework that we have to
address before utilising them in our solution.
Traditionally, most of the private network solutions for similar problem spaces
require the direct and continuous control of a centralised administration entity
over every aspect of the overlay network, consisting of all the participants that
constitute and facilitate the operation of the service being deployed and run on
the multiple cloud providers. Such a central controller provides services to au-
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thenticate, secure and police the interactions amongst peers. These centralised
solutions make it almost necessary to provide complex support and management
functionalities to meet the user demands of smooth and continuous operation.
Furthermore, to robustly handle the loads generated by a large number of
users, significant infrastructure resources and services like mirroring or redun-
dant instances and load-balancers must be set aside, incurring additional costs
for the service owner. Peer-to-Peer overlays, on the other hand, are designed to
offer improved scalability, flexibility and availability in a distributed fashion without
extensive reliance on centralised servers or resources. For these reasons, such
overlay networks have been used very successfully to provide specialized appli-
cation layer services like voice over IP (VoIP) e.g., Skype [19] and file sharing
e.g., Bittorrent [46].
Having discussed the shortfalls of the centralised approach used in virtual pri-
vate networks above, we also need to highlight some common problems present
in current Peer-to-Peer techniques that adversely effect our research efforts. These
problems are concerned with the seamless bootstrapping of services like peer
discovery and resource advertisement and discovery. In all structured Peer-to-
Peer overlays, a joining peer is required to have relevant information about at least
one other peer that is already in the overlay, and the current structured Peer-to-
Peer overlays do not offer a scalable solution for the seamless bootstrapping of
these services. This can be seen in the specifications of the popular structured
Peer-to-Peer overlays [14] and [91].
Therefore, a key research contribution is the following architecture of a scal-
able communication framework that can bootstrap multiple Peer-to-Peer overlays,
each able to provide the VPN functionality over multiple cloud providers’ infras-
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tructure. We strive to explain the detailed design of our core secure communica-
tion framework in two segments. In the first segment (Section 4.1.1) we describe
the architecture of the core communication framework in terms of its salient com-
ponents and their relationship with each other. In the second segment (Sec-
tion 4.1.2) we describe the core work-flow and protocol design that is followed in
order to establish the secure communication links between these components.
4.1.1 Inter-Cloud VPN Overlays
The core research innovation employed in our Inter-Cloud VPN framework is the
loose and dynamic integration of two tiers of peer-to-peer overlays, i.e., a ’univer-
sal peer-to-peer overlay’ and service or application-specific ’VPN overlays’. The
universal overlay is the top tier peer-to-peer overlay that every peer node (virtual
machine) participating in the formation of a secure virtual private network is ex-
pected to join. Therefore, the main role of the universal overlay is to act as a
facilitator that provides services to bootstrap and launch the individual VPN over-
lays. Each VPN overlay is formed dynamically and is logically separate from the
universal overlay, however, some of the peer nodes of a VPN overlay are a subset
of the super peer nodes of the universal overlay.
A distinct benefit of our framework design is that a single universal peer-to-
peer overlay can be used to provide a scalable and secure infrastructure service
for initiating and binding multiple VPN overlays on top of different cloud platforms,
as long as the peer nodes of the universal overlay are accessible to the peer
nodes of the VPN overlays deployed on these cloud platforms. The universal
overlay itself can be initiated either by the service owner, a cloud broker or the
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cloud service providers and kept in operation for an indefinite amount of time,
thus providing a long-term and reliable universal launch service to individual VPN
overlays.
The Fig. 4.1 shows a reference deployment scenario where the universal over-
lay has been initiated on two different cloud service providers and the peer nodes
of the universal overlay are accessible from the VPN peer nodes running on vir-
tual machines that have been deployed on three cloud service providers. To avoid
creating a chaotic and confused depiction, Fig. 4.1 only illustrates the composi-
tion of a single VPN overlay over the three cloud service providers. However, the
benefits of the flexibility and decentralised nature of our architecture is not hard to
conceptualise here as a large number of VPN overlays can be constructed with
the help of the universal overlay, depending on the requirements of the users and
the cloud service providers.
As discussed earlier, the universal overlay is the overlay that the peer nodes of
the underlying VPN overlays have to join and therefore it helps with the bootstrap-
ping activity of the VPN overlay peers. Thus the universal overlay essentially adds
a layer of abstraction over the underlying VPN overlays. This abstraction can also
come in handy when providing other functions such as service advertisement,
service discovery mechanisms, and service code provisioning, with minimal re-
quirement for manual configuration and administration.
This approach acts as an aggregation service for the eventually peered over-
lay resources, which in this case are virtual machines, and spans across multiple
cloud domains to help form a virtual private network. The peers of the universal
overlay act as super peers for the nodes of the underlying VPN overlays and let
new nodes enrol, authenticate, bootstrap and join a particular VPN overlay based
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on the cloud service requiring the VPN service.







Figure 4.1: The two-tiered architecture for the Inter-Cloud VPN, with the nodes of
the Universal Overlay acting as the super peers whereas the nodes of the VPN
overlay acting as normal peers
As depicted in Fig. 4.1, a service owner/user, a cloud broker, or a cloud ser-
vice provider could itself be a peer node in the universal overlay and a subset of
the universal overlay peer nodes can act as super-peers for the peer nodes of the
VPN overlay for a particular cloud service or application. The universal overlay
peers can join and leave the system dynamically and additional VMs from the
cloud providers can be provisioned to act as the universal overlay peers as well.
As both the universal and the VPN overlay nodes are basically running on VMs
provisioned from different cloud providers, they can be demoted or promoted from
these overlays respectively based on parameters like performance and availabil-
ity.
To join the universal overlay, each peer needs to acquire a unique identifica-
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tion number (PID). This is generated by the peer itself on its first initialization on a
VM as a unique 160-bit random number. It also needs some bootstrapping data
to validate itself with a super peer for admission into the overlay. The bootstrap-
ping data consists of the IP addresses of the super peers, the ID of the cloud
service or application that this particular VM belongs to and that cloud service’s
or application’s secret key. This data is embedded in a secure cache on the vir-
tual machine by a VM contextualization service [13], when it is provisioned for
the cloud service deployment and the same contextualization service is used to
install the peer-to-peer client in the VM1.
After the bootstrapping phase, the peer follows the admission control protocol
described in Chapter 5, Section 5.3 for a validated admission into the overlay,
using the cloud service’s or application’s secret key as the required password.
After the completion of the bootstrapping process, the VPN peer requests for
enrolment with one of the super peer node in the universal overlay. The super
peer checks its enrolment policy to see if the requesting peer node passes the re-
quirements. After the successful enrolment process, the peer authenticates itself
with the super peer using the secret key provided to it by the VM contextualiza-
tion service. For this, the peer follows the admission control protocol described in
Chapter 5, Section 5.3 for an authenticated admission into the overlay, using the
cloud service’s or application’s secret key as the required password.
If the authentication is successful, the peer asks for the list of the neighbouring
peers in its overlay that are part of the same cloud service. The super peer can
query for all the peer nodes that belong to a particular cloud service by using
the serviceID and return the results to the requesting peer. Similarly, the peer
1See Appendix A for a more detailed description
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Figure 4.2: Sequence diagram depicting the steps undertaken for the formation of
a VPN Overlay, with the VM Contextualization service bootstrapping the process
and the SuperPeer facilitating with secure enrolment and automatic configuration
etc.
asks for the security tokens/keys that it needs for use in the protocol to form
secure communication channels with other peers of its VPN overlay and the initial
configurations that it requires to follow for the protocol.
81
4. Inter-Cloud VPN Overlay
In the current implementation we use and compare two models; the Public Key
Infrastructure model (PKI) where the super peer act as Certificate Authority (CA)
and can issue signed certificates to the authenticated peers which are valid for a
fixed time duration. The peers can use these certificates to validate each other
as well as use them in the security protocols which support the PKI model. In the
upcoming Chapter 6, Section 6.4 we also develop and evaluate an alternative to
the PKI model which uses Functional Cryptography to solve the same problem
more efficiently.
After all this information is made available to the peer, it joins the VPN overlay
and starts with the process of constructing secure communication tunnels with
other peers of the same VPN overlay according to the policies it has received in
the configuration data. The configuration data can be updated dynamically and
all the peers check with the super peers periodically so that they can apply and
use the latest policies according to the service demands. A sequence diagram
describing this flow of operations is depicted in Fig.4.2.
In a typical usage scenario, the service/application owner is responsible for
provisioning virtual machines from cloud service providers to deploy and run their
services. These virtual machines are considered as the peers of the VPN over-
lays and the complete life-cycle of the peers is handled by a peer-to-peer client
embedded in the appliance image used to instantiate a virtual machine on a cloud
platform.
However, a further advantage of the universal overlay approach is that the
peers of a VPN overlay can get, update and modify the peer-to-peer client pro-
gram dynamically from the super-peers in the universal overlay. The program to
be run is signed by the super-peers for validity and it can check for updated ver-
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sions of itself by querying for the associated serviceID in the persistent store of
the DHT of the universal overlay.
4.1.2 Secure Virtual Private Connections
The main components of the peer-to-peer client used to construct a virtual private
network in our model are shown in Fig. 4.3. These include the standard compo-
nents required to form a structured peer-to-peer overlay like the Distributed Hash
Table (DHT) service, which basically acts as the command-and-control (C&C)
channel for the ICVPN solution, key-based routing, peer discovery, bootstrapping
service and overlay maintenance service. All of these services are constructed by

















Figure 4.3: Architecture of a Inter-Cloud VPN P2P Client node, the architecture
being identical for both super peer nodes in the Universal Overlay and VPN peer
nodes in a VPN Overlay
In addition to these peer-to-peer specific components, we specify and set-
aside a secure content storage for the client where sensitive data like keys, pass-
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words, and security tokens etc. are stored. The configuration component is in-
tegrated with the overlays DHT so that the clients behaviour can be modified
dynamically by pulling new configurations from the super peers. The configura-
tion component manages both the peer-to-peer related configurations as well as
the policies used to configure the IPsec tunnels between the peers for the use
of the higher-level services using the client to provide the secure communication
framework.
The peer-to-peer client software sets up and configures the IPsec Security As-
sociations according the cloud service/application network security policy, which
is advertised by the cloud service/application owner through the DHT of the uni-
versal overlay. The peers of the underlying VPN overlay periodically check for any
update in the security policy and apply and enforce any changes on the kernel of
the VM through the Peer-to-Peer client’s IPsec interface.
The key feature of our Inter-Cloud VPN is establishing a secure communica-
tion tunnel between the peers of the overlay formed over a collection of cloud
providers infrastructure. Therefore, after successfully joining the overlay network
to become part of a service, a VPN peer starts the process of creating secure
tunnels to the other peers of the service it wants to communicate with, according
to the functional policy of that particular service. To achieve this, we make use of
the Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocol suite [55] to authenticate and en-
crypt each IP packet of a particular communication session between the peers,
thus creating end-to-end tunnels which provide protection against eavesdropping,
message tempering and message forgeries.
For establishing mutual authentication between peers at the beginning of the
IPsec session and negotiation of cryptographic keys to be used during the ses-
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sion, we employ the Internet Key Exchange protocol [95], which can make use of
standard cryptographic primitives like public key cryptography [52] and AES [1].
In our current implementation, we have used and compared two key exchange
methods. First is the PKI certificate-based method where the super peers act
as a Certificate Authority (CA) and each peer is issued a signed certificate upon
authenticated completion of the bootstrapping process and queries the Universal
Overlay DHT for resource discovery and gets the resulting data back which is
encrypted by the owning peer using its private key. Second is the authenticated
key exchange scheme, described below, which is used to derive a secure ses-
sion key which can be used in the Cipher-Block-Chaining (CBC) mode with AES
to ensure the confidentiality of the traffic exchanges between the peers using the
tunnel [82].
This second approach removes the Diffie-Hellmans well-known susceptibility
to an active Man-in-the-Middle attack. This is done by providing a way to mutually
authenticate the key exchange between communicating peers. In most traditional
systems, this is done by depending on digital signatures backed by a centrally
managed PKI. However, it has been shown from a practical point of view that
deploying and managing a central PKI can be a complex and problematic expe-
rience as evident from the DigiNotar and Comodo incidents [103]. PKIs require
too many managerial as well as computational and communicational resources,
which are not easy to commit by a small scale cloud service customer. Espe-
cially in our target use case, where such customers wants to use the resources
of multiple cloud providers, they typically does not want to deal with issues like
cross-carrier authentication, certificate revocation lists, and other complexities.
It is therefore a much simpler approach to avoid PKIs altogether, especially
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when developing secure commercial products. Hence, we augment the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange with secure hash usage at the start of the key exchange
and so PKI is not needed for this approach to mutually authenticate the key ex-
change. The session keys generated as a result of this method, for the IPsec
communication, are valid for a short period of time and when the keys expire the
protocol is run again to come up with new session keys to maintain the IPsec
tunnels. The peers of the VPN overlay use the following protocol to agree on a
secret key S and parameters for establishing the IPsec tunnels between the VMs
for secure communication. This protocol comes into action immediately after the
communicating peers have completed the resource discovery phase and want to
proceed to the secure communication phase.
All of the following operations use a finite cyclic group G of prime order p and a
generating element g ∈ G. The initiating peer A generates its ephemeral key pair
before entering the secure communication phase. The peer begins the exchange
by sending a Hello message to the other peer. The Hello message contains the
peer ID of the peer. The peer ID is a unique 160-bit random string (PID) that has
been generated by the peer-to-peer algorithm (in this case Kademlia) and can
be used to index and look up credentials and configuration data from the overlay
DHT for a particular peer. The responding peer B replies with a Hello message of
its own, containing its PID. On its receipt of the response, peer A sends the cyclic
group generator g, the prime p and Â = ga (mod p) to the peer B. A hash of the
public parameters g, p, Â, and the Hello message of responder B is performed
and sent in the same message to prevent active Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
hash(g ∣∣p ∣∣ Â ∣∣B(Hello))
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All subsequent messages also contain a hash image that is used to link the
messages together. This allows rejection of false messages injected during an
exchange by an active Man-in-the-Middle attacker. On receipt of the above mes-
sage, peer B checks the hash using the received public parameters for A and its
own Hello message. If it matches, it generates its own random secret value b and
computes its public parameter B̂, i.e., B̂ = gb (mod p), and sends it to A with the
hash. It then calculates the result as,
R̂ = (Â)b (mod p)
Now A can deduce the same result as,
R̂ = (B̂)a (mod p)
For the calculation of the shared secret S, first a total hash Hτ of all the
received and sent messages in the current exchange is calculated by both peers.
The final shared secret is the hash of a concatenation of the R̂, the PID’s of A
and B, and the Hτ .
S = hash(R̂ ∣∣PIDA ∣∣PIDB ∣∣Hτ )
The PIDs act as the context fields andHτ as a nonce value, as recommended
in [39].
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4.2 Prototype Implementation
We have implemented a working prototype of Inter-Cloud VPN architecture and its
constituent Peer-to-Peer clients using the Java programming language [59] that
can be deployed on Linux-based operating systems [153]. We were motivated by
the following reasons to use Java for the prototype development, after suffering
from some initial problems with other technologies:-
• A large number of cryptographic and peer-to-peer protocols and libraries
have been developed in Java and are easily available.
• It was easier to integrate components of our framework with the VM Con-
textualizer service as this service is also developed in Java and is exposed
as a Java Remote Procedure Call (RPC).
• We were able to utilise the Java NIO2 libraries to develop multi-threaded,
non-blocking and scalable core networking components that perform much
better than a traditional socket-based implementation.
• There is excellent documentation and useful community help easily avail-
able online for Java related technologies.
The choice of using Linux as the base operating system to run and test our
prototype instances due to the following reasons:-
• As it is an open source operating system, we did not have to worry about
licenses.
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• After cursory evaluation, it became clear to us that instances of Linux based
virtual machines launch much faster on most cloud computing platforms
than their proprietary competitor.
• The IPsec protocol suite is fully implemented and available in the most re-
cent Linux based operating systems.
• A large number of useful tools are available in Linux for the management
of IPsec tunnels and connections like ipsec-tools, racoon, OpenSwan and
StrongSwan etc.
Other than the core components of our communication framework, the imple-
mentation of our core research contributions (mechanisms and protocols) was
also done using open source libraries and APIs. Specifically, we chose the Boun-
cyCastle library [124] to implement and batch together most of the required cryp-
tographic primitives, as well as the PKI alternatives that were required for the
comparisons. This was due to the fact that BouncyCastle is one of the most light-
weight and extensive cryptographic libraries that is designed with very strong
emphasis on standards compliance and adaptability. In the same vein, we used
the cpabe library [26] for building the Functional Encryption mechanisms, and
the TomP2P library [28] for its implementation of the Kademlia [114] peer-to-peer
protocol and the overlay DHT. In addition, we use the commercially available BT
Compute Cloud platform [32], Flexiant FlexiScale cloud platform [66], and a Xen
hyper-visor based cloud platform [17] from ATOS Origin as our experimental test-
bed.
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4.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we present the results of a series of experiments we conducted to
evaluate the effect of our prototype ICVPN solution upon the network performance
of a service deployed on two different cloud IaaS providers. We use a 3-tier web
service comprising of database, business logic and presentation components de-
ployed on nine virtual machines hosted on the cloud platforms provided by ATOS
Origin, British Telecom Ltd., and Flexiant Ltd.
The purpose of these experiments is to evaluate the architecture being pro-
posed, in terms of service latency and service throughput, in a practical scenario
with a service deployed over a real wide-area network, with the BT cloud platform
geographically located in Ipswich, England, Flexiant cloud platform located in Liv-
ingston, Scotland, and ATOS cloud platform located in Barcelona, Spain. We
define service latency as the inter-cloud round-trip time taken by a HTTP (Hyper
Text Transfer Protocol) [65] request, issued by a service component on one cloud,
to get a response from the target service component on a different cloud. Sim-
ilarly, service throughput is the inter-cloud network throughput between service
components deployed on different clouds.
In this section we introduce the methodology we used to design, conduct and
evaluate our experiments. We firstly explain the metrics that we measure in our
experiments, and then the methodology we used to measure them.
4.3.1 Latency Evaluation Methodology
In the domain of network performance measurement, latency is traditionally de-
fined in term of round-trip time (RTT), that is, the length of time it takes for a
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source to send a data packet to a destination and receive a reply from the des-
tination. Latency is used most commonly in form of RTT as it can be measured
from a single point, so as long as the source and destination are using a well-
defined and consistent network protocol, there is no need to set up or manage a
latency experiment on the destination.
An example of such protocol is Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
[129], which is usually implemented on all network devices and operating sys-
tems. The ICMP contains a large number of message types that can be used for
network diagnostic or traffic control purposes. The ones typically used for mea-
suring latency are the Echo Request and Echo Reply messages. Various network
tools are available that utilise these ICMP messages to measure network latency,
packet loss and traffic jitter etc.
4.3.1.1 Measurement Tools
Some of the tools commonly used for accurate measurement of latency in com-
puter networks are ping [121], traceroute [42], MTR [97], PathPing [117], and
nmap [111]. However, all of these use the ICMP messages described earlier in
some form or another to calculate the RTT latency between network hosts. The
most prevalent of these is the ping tool that gives the results of the ICMP echo
request and reply messages in the form of a statistical summary of the reply pack-
ets received. This includes the minimum RTT, maximum RTT, mean RTT, and the
standard deviation of the RTT.
However, the ping utility has been abused in the past as a form of Denial-
of-Service attack on some networks. This was historically done as a Ping Flood
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[160] or Ping of Death [112]. Although most of the ping related security vulnerabil-
ity have been fixed over the years, most of the commercial network environments
still disable or block ICMP traffic coming into their networks. As a result it is im-
possible to use ICMP based tools to conduct any latency related experiments on
these networks.
Therefore, we make use of the Httping tool [156], which works on the same
principal as the ping tool, but instead of using the ICMP messages, it uses the
HTTP protocol requests and response messages to measure the latency. As this
latency is measured at the application layer, instead of the network layer as in
ping, the RTT time is usually greater for HTTP requests. So to keep the size of
the requests minimum, we only send a HTTP request and retrieve only the Header
field of the HTTP reply message, which contains the required timestamps used
in calculating the RTT.
4.3.2 Throughput Evaluation Methodology
Throughput is traditionally defined as the amount of data that is successfully sent
from the source host to the destination host via a network link. It is one of the key
metrics that has to be measured when investigating the performance of a network
protocol or application. In case of a LAN environment where the network link is
usually Point-to-Point, the maximum theoretical throughput is usually very close
to the channel capacity of the physical link, this is,
Throughput ≈
Bitrate × Transmission T ime
Round Trip T ime
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However, this is not the case in WAN links, like those encounters in the inter-
cloud environment. For example, the TCP [36] throughput may be quite limited
as compared to the theoretical channel capacity of the links between the com-
municating hosts, as it is affected by every component along the route from the
source to the destination, including all the hardware and software components
like switches, routers and forwarding, and routing protocols. Therefore, as its not
possible to measure the maximum theoretical throughput, we have to measure
the achievable TCP throughput, that depends on the network link capacity, the
TCP/IP stack implementation on the networking components, their processing
power, NIC (Network Interface Card) speeds, and the buffer sizes on end hosts.
Hence, we need a tool that is able to handle this complexity for us and can give
us accurate achievable throughput results.
4.3.2.1 Measurement Tools
For conducting and measuring the throughput experiments on our solution, we
make use of the Iperf [152] tool, which measures the throughput between two
hosts by measuring the amount of data sent over a fixed interval of time. Iperf is
quite commonly used in both academic and commercial to gather and evaluate
network performance statistics [4], [130], [43], and [126]. Iperf is also attractive for
us as it allows variations in many TCP parameters like Window Size and amount
of data to be transmitted. However, Iperf needs to be run for longer interval of
times or in multiple bursts, to counter the effects of TCP Slow Start. Slow Start
[144] is the congestion control mechanism used by the TCP to avoid sending
more data than the network is capable of transmitting. For our experiments, we
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overcome the effects of TCP Slow Start by first measuring the minimum amount
of data that needs to be transmitted between VMs on different cloud platforms
that will give us stable and reliable throughput results.
4.3.2.2 Data Size for Throughput Experiments
We measure the minimum amount of data that is required to be transmitted be-
tween three different cloud platforms, which are BT (British Telecom), Flexiant
and ATOS cloud platforms. Finding out a fixed data size to be transmitted in
the ICVPN throughput experiments is important for two main reasons. Firstly, it
will greatly simplify the process of measuring throughput between different cloud
platforms as it is the otherwise the only variable parameter required by the Iperf
tool. Secondly, a minimum size is also important to bring down the bandwidth
costs incurred when transferring data in or out of a commercial cloud. In order to
measure achievable throughput reliably, we set up the Iperf tool on these cloud
platforms and run data transmission tests between them, gradually increasing the
amount of data transmitted in each successive test.
We start by transmitting 1 MB random data between the cloud platforms and
go up to 50 MB of data, and measure the throughput achieved for each run.
This upper limit of 50 MB was chosen on the basis of empirical inference from
experiments done in the similar domains, as in [93] and [157]. We consider each
run of these 50 tests as one experiment and repeat each experiment two more
times at different times of the day to get a more rounded vision of the achievable
throughput between the cloud platforms. The results of the 50 tests for each
experiment between ATOS and BT cloud platforms are given in Fig. 4.4, giving us
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Figure 4.4: Plot of 150 throughput measurements of 1-50 MB data transfers be-
tween ATOS and BT cloud platforms in order to find the most stable 3-tuple mea-
surements
We plot the trend-lines for each experiment in Fig. 4.4, that depicts the through-
put as a function of data size, for transfers from ATOS to BT cloud platforms. We
got almost identical results for the opposite direction experiments as well (BT to
ATOS cloud platforms), so we only include single-direction results here. These
trend-lines conform to the typical TCP throughput behaviour [109], that is, it in-
creases exponentially with increase in data size and then stabilises as the net-
work capacity is reached, thus following a power law with a long tail. This is due to
the well-known [169] strong correlation between throughput and data size. How-
ever, we are mainly interested in finding out that against what amount of data are
we able to achieve the most stable throughput results among the three experi-
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ments. We define the most stable throughput results as the results having the
least amount of standard deviation among them for a fixed amount of data. From
Fig. 4.4, we can see that the most stable throughput was achieved for 39 MB data
size.
Similarly, the results of the 50 tests for each experiment between BT and
Flexiant cloud platforms are given in Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6. We conducted the
throughput experiment in both directions between the BT and Flexiant cloud plat-
forms because of the major difference in the throughput results depending on
the direction. When transmitting data from BT to the Flexiant cloud platform, the
throughput trend shows a very stable rate from almost the start and maintains it
for most of the experiment data points. The average throughput achieved in this
direction was 47.31 Mbps.
This changes to an average throughput of 117.32 Mbps when transmitting
data from Flexiant to the BT cloud platform, which is more than double the through-
put seen in the reverse direction. In addition to that, throughput trend-lines also
follows the typical and expected throughput behaviour that was also observed in
Fig. 4.4. Nevertheless, these difference do not fundamentally effect our evalua-
tion as our focus is on the stability of the throughput to find out the optimal data
size to be transmitted, not the non-conformance of the trend-lines to the known
throughput behaviour.
Furthermore, as it is very difficult to ascertain the exact and detailed knowl-
edge of the underlying physical wide-area network connectivity between the two
cloud service providers, we cannot speculate on the reason of this difference
based on direction of transmission. However, such differences are not unheard
of in this domain and are usually due to differences in upstream and downstream
96
4. Inter-Cloud VPN Overlay
traffic throttling policies, differences in routes chosen by the IP packets, and fire-
wall policy issues. We did not see similar issues between BT and ATOS cloud
platforms, therefore we only include the experiment results for tests conducted

































Figure 4.5: Plot of 150 throughput measurements of 1-50 MB data transfers from
BT to Flexiant clouds in order to find the most stable 3-tuple measurements
As in the case of ATOS - BT throughput experiments, we again plot the trend-
lines for each experiment in this case as well, as shown in Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6.
We observe that the most stable throughput was achieved for 32 MB of data
transmitted from BT to Flexiant cloud platform and 17 MB for the reverse direction.
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Figure 4.6: TPlot of 150 throughput measurements of 1-50 MB data transfers
from Flexiant to BT clouds in order to find the most stable 3-tuple measurements
The summarised results for the most stable achieved throughput for all one
hundred and fifty experiments conducted on the three cloud platforms are given in
Table 4.1. Based on the mean data size of these results, we chose the fixed data
size of 30 MB when conducting throughput experiments on the ICVPN solution.
Table 4.1: Throughput results with least standard deviation against corresponding
transmitted data size
Throughput ExperimentsCloud
Platforms Least Std Dev Data Size
ATOS - BT 0.43 39 MB
BT - Flexiant 0.44 32 MB
Flexiant - BT 0.77 17 MB
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4.3.3 Scalability Evaluation Methodology
Although there is no generally accepted definition of scalability, it can be identified
as the ability of a system to handle and process increasing amount of work load
efficiently. In the domain of computer networks, a system is usually said to be
scalable if the addition of resources proportional to the increase of work load
increases or maintains its current level of performance. An ideal and desirable
characteristic of scalable solutions is that the increase in resources lead to a
linear increase in service capacity. In other words, if there are a n entities that
are affecting the work load of a system, then the amount of resources required to
process the increased load must increase less than n2 [58].
Analysing and measuring the scalability of a system is considered quite im-
portant, especially when designing new architectures [78], as the design and ar-
chitecture of a system has the greatest influence on its scalability. In fact, a better
design can give better scalability to a system than better hardware or more code
optimisation and fine-tuning. Therefore, it is important to note here that scalability
and performance are two separate entities. In fact, sometimes optimising a sys-
tem for maximum performance can sometimes adversely affect the scalability of
that system [29].
4.3.3.1 Measurement Tools
There are different types of scalability discussed in the literature that can be mea-
sured and analysed for different kind of systems, protocols and architectures.
These include load scalability, space scalability, space-time scalability, and struc-
tural scalability [29] etc. However, for analysing the architecture of Inter-Cloud
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VPN solution we analyse and evaluate its load scalability. This is generally de-
fined as the the ability of a system to function normally under increased work
loads, without requiring the use of exponentially increased resources. This type
of scalability is appropriate for evaluation in the case of Inter-Cloud VPN, as al-
though we have a distributed peer-to-peer architecture, the main resource that is
managing the bulk of the operations at the start up phase of the VPN overlays is










































Figure 4.7: Design of the load scalability experiment to measure the effects of
increasing the numbers of parallel bootstrapping requests from the VPN peer
nodes (P2P Clients) to the Universal Overlay
Therefore, in order to measure the load scalability of our solution, we set up an
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environment where we can run the experiment of increasing the number of super
peers and measuring the number of requests per second that they can handle
from the peer-to-peer clients. In order to do so efficiently, we make use of the
GNU Parallel tool [149]. GNU parallel is a Linux shell tool that can be used for
executing programs in parallel, using one or more computers. This is useful for
us as it is logistically and financially hard for us to create thousands of VMs on
our cloud platform test-beds, therefore we use a limited number of VMs in each
of our cloud platforms and instantiate and large number of peer-to-peer clients on
each VM. The design of this experiment is shown in Fig.4.7.
So in other words, we use GNU Parallel as a load management tool. Its job
is to launch a small bash script that starts a peer-to-peer VPN client and give
it the address of the super peer as input. In case of multiple super peers, we
chose the super peer, to be used by the peer-to-peer client for bootstrapping, in
a round-robin fashion [142]. This method is chosen in order to distribute the load
uniformly among the participating super peers. Our GNU Parallel script is able to
split the input list of super peers and pipe it into the launch commands in parallel.
Furthermore, the super peers are multi-threaded and implement asynchronous
I/O so that they do not block on the client’s bootstrapping requests and can act in
a more responsive manner. We accomplish this by using the Netty API, which is
an asynchronous event-driven network application API that is commonly used for
development of high performance network protocols [113].
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4.4 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section we illustrate the results of our experiments. We firstly present the
latency, throughput and scalability results we measured on our experimental test-
bed comprising of three cloud platforms, and then analyse them in comparison
with alternate approaches.
4.4.1 Service Latency
We compare the latency between the components of the service deployed on
different cloud providers, as the latency between the components in the same
cloud is almost negligible as they are usually hosted on either the same hyper-




























Service Latency experiments 
BT-to-Flex without ICVPN BT-to-Flex with ICVPN
Figure 4.8: Service latency of 240 HTTP HEAD round-trip time request-response
messages from BT to Flexiant clouds
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We measured the latency by using the round-trip delay of an HTTP HEAD
request/response pair, as the components of the web service communicate with
each other using HTTP protocol and ICMP, the de facto latency measurement
protocol, is blocked in the networks of our cloud providers. The main benefit of
using the HTTP HEAD request is that the HTTP HEAD reply message does not




























Service Latency experiments 
Flex-to-BT without ICVPN Flex-to-BT with ICVPN
Figure 4.9: Service latency of 240 HTTP HEAD round-trip time request-response
messages from Flexiant to BT clouds
We computed the average latency by running 10 experiments very hour for
a period of 24 hours, firstly without using the Inter-Cloud VPN solution and then
with it. The results for the 240 experiments run between BT and Flexiant cloud
platforms are shown in Fig. 4.8 and Fig. 4.9. As is clear from the graphs, we get
consistent latency results independent of the direction of the experiments and the
variation of latency within the experiments itself is also quite minimal. Catering
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Service Latency experiments 
BT-ATOS without ICVPN BT-ATOS with ICVPN
Figure 4.10: Service latency of 240 HTTP HEAD round-trip time request-
response messages from BT to ATOS clouds
We repeated the same set of service latency experiments for BT and ATOS
cloud platforms. The results for these 240 experiments run between BT and ATOS
cloud platforms are shown in Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11. In this case as well we get
consistent latency results independent of the direction of the experiments and the
variation of latency within the experiments itself is minimal too. Catering for the
bi-directional latency in this case, we get a mean overhead of 5.35% when using
the Inter-Cloud VPN solution.
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Service Latency experiments 
ATOS-BT without ICVPN ATOS-BT with ICVPN
Figure 4.11: Service latency of 240 HTTP HEAD round-trip time request-
response messages from ATOS to BT clouds
Looking at the results, we can see that using our solution only has a small
impact on the HTTP latency, increasing it just by about 5%. For further analysis
we collect the network traffic dump when running our experiments, using the tcp-
dump packet sniffer. We found out from the traffic dumps that the increased delay
we encountered is mostly due to the additional packets transmitted and received
by the peers for the purposes of key exchange and cryptographic primitives ne-
gotiation when establishing an IPsec tunnel. After this initial protocol handshake
phase is over, the latency performance is almost same in the comparative exper-
iments.
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4.4.2 Service Throughput
We measure the throughput between components of the service deployed on our
three test-bed cloud platforms. We measured the throughput in both directions by
transferring 30 MB of data, a size chosen earlier in this section according to the
results gathered from experiments conducted in Section 4.3.2.2. We computed
the average throughput by running 10 experiments every hour for a period of 24
hours, firstly without using the Inter-Cloud VPN solution and then with it. The





























Service Throughput experiments 
BT-to-Flex without ICVPN BT-to-Flex with ICVPN
Figure 4.12: Throughput of 240 data transmission experiments from BT to Flexi-
ant clouds
From the throughput results, the first thing that stands out is the difference in
the throughput values depending on the direction of transferring the data. We
have discussed this issue in some detail in Section 4.3.2.2 previously.
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Service Throughput experiments 
Flex-to-BT without ICVPN Flex-to-BT with ICVPN
Figure 4.13: Throughput of 240 data transmission experiments from Flexiant to
BT clouds
Irrespective of that, by looking at the comparative results it is clear that we just
incur a small overhead in the throughput, of about 10%. By analysing the traffic
dumps generated from the throughout test, we can attribute this overhead to the
IKE and IPsec handshakes, in addition to the extra time taken by the VM kernel
in encrypting and encapsulating 30 MB of data for each throughput test.
4.4.3 Service Scalability
As we have mentioned above, one of the main motivation of using peer-to-peer
overlays in our solution is their ability to scale as the number of virtual machines
in the inter-cloud VPN service increases with the possible increase in the work-
load. Some cloud services and applications can easily expand to hundreds, even
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thousands, of virtual machines across multiple clouds and it is important that our
solution is able to cope with this sort of scalability.
Therefore, in order to measure the scalability of our solution, we observe the
scale-up behaviour of the super peers of our universal overlay as more and more
P2P clients request to enrol and join their respective VPN overlays. The metric
that we use to measure the scalability is the number of bootstrapping requests
that a super peer can service per second as more and more VPN peers try to join
an overlay.
For this measurement, due to the limitation of resources and privileges in our
test-bed cloud providers, instead of launching thousands of VMs to emulate a
large number of peers trying to join an overlay, we launch only a few VMs con-
taining the P2P client in each cloud provider but create more and more instances
of the peer in the same VM to simulate a heavy workload. On the other hand,
we increase the number of super peers handling the bootstrapping and observe
how many requests they were able to process per second by looking into their log
files. Again, due to the limitation of resources and privileges, we limit the number
of virtual machines acting as the dedicated super peers to 4 on each of our two
test-bed cloud providers used in this experiment, BT and ATOS.
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1 Super Peer 2 Super Peers 4 Super Peers 8 Super Peers
Figure 4.14: Experiments measuring bootstrapping requests processed per sec-
ond against increasing number of Super Peers
Fig. 4.14 shows the results of experimental measurements of the number of
bootstrapping requests processed by the Inter-Cloud VPN solution, by doubling
the number of super peers in the universal overlay starting from 1 up to 8. To
generate the bootstrapping load, we create 10 VMs on each cloud platform which
contain the P2P client, and each VM then instantiates 25 instances of the P2P
client simultaneously in order to generate the required work load for the super
peers, using the GNU Parallel tool as the launch controller. The same tool is also
used to send the list of available super peers to the launch scripts. We repeated
this experiment periodically 25 times in order to cater for the adverse effects of
jitter, and with 1, 2, 4, and 8 super peers. As it is apparent from Fig. 4.14, we did
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not actually observe a lot of jitter and observed very low variation in the number
of bootstrap requests per second for all quantities of the super peers.


































No. of Super Peers 
Figure 4.15: Trend of increasing the number of Super Peers on the average num-
ber of bootstrapping requests processed per second
As we can see in Fig 4.15, our solution was able to handle more bootstrapping
requests per second on average, as we increased the number of super peers. As
observed from the trend-line in Fig. 4.15, our solution is able to scale linearly
to hundreds of requests per second against the number of super peers in the
Universal overlay. We attribute this linear progression to the distributed design
of our solution and this progression can be scaled to handle even thousands
of requests per second by linearly increasing the number of super peers in the
system.
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4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have given a detailed description of the design and implemen-
tation details about our Inter-Cloud VPN overlay solution. We have expanded on
the techniques and mechanisms that we mentioned briefly in Chapter 3 and show
how we modify and integrate them to come up with an efficient framework. This
has been done by trying to model the architecture based on a realistic reference
deployment scenario, where we have consider a cloud service that is deployed
on multiple real-world cloud platforms.
Therefore, we started by detailing our novel scheme of employing a two-tiered
overlay network, with the a single universal overlay focusing on management
level functionalities and multiple, per-service VPN overlays focusing on the se-
cure communication aspects. The universal overlay provides a scalable service
to initiate and bind multiple VPN overlays to different cloud services, so the pri-
mary service that it provides is the integrated bootstrapping of the VPN peers
of a cloud service. It accomplishes this by using the DHT, both as a distributed
data store for data sharing, as well as a command & control channel. The peers
of the universal overlay act as super-peers for the nodes of the underlying VPN
overlays, so they can enrol, authenticate, bootstrap and join nodes to a particular
VPN overlay based on the cloud service requesting the VPN service.
The VPN overlays provide the core security functionalities required to estab-
lish and maintain secure communication links between the nodes constituting a
VPN overlay. It does that by utilising some of the protocols available in the IPsec
protocol suite and the security meta-data, like the session keys, that are made
available to it by the universal overlay. We detail the authenticated key sharing
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protocol that we use to generate and share the session keys between the peers
of the VPN overlay, as well as the design and architecture of our P2P VPN client
that is embedded in the image of each participating VM.
Lastly, we gave the implementation details of the solution and how we evalu-
ated its performance as deployed on two real-world commercial cloud platforms.
We carried out a large number of experiments, over a long time interval, to evalu-
ate the performance of our framework in terms of latency, scalability and through-
put. From the results that we gathered, we were able to show that our devised
solution incurred a minimum overhead of approximately 5 % in terms of latency,
and an overhead of about 10 % in terms of throughput. With respect to scalabil-
ity, we showed that the replication of super peers leads to a linear increase in the
number of bootstrapping requests processed per second.
In the next chapter, we describe in detail how we solve the problem of secure
admission of a peer of a VPN overlay with the help of a super peer in the universal
overlay. We list and describe some of the traditional solutions of this problem
and show how they are not really suitable for an inter-cloud model. A secure
admission control process is really important as it is a requirement of the scalable
key sharing and secure communication scheme detailed in the current chapter,
as these schemes are effective only after the peers join the overlay as the result
of a secure admission process.
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Inter-Cloud VPN Admission Control
5.1 Admission Control in Peer-to-Peer Systems
It is important to control the admission of peers in the Inter-Cloud VPN frame-
work to safeguard and protect the resources, credentials, data and meta-data
present in the DHT of the universal overlay from unauthorised and malicious
users. Although the inter-cloud network has a complex and heterogeneous envi-
ronment, we have to employ efficient and scalable security mechanisms that can
protect our communication with minimal performance overhead. In this chapter
we present the design and implementation of the Admission Control scheme that
we have incorporated in the Inter-Cloud VPN solution.
5.1.1 Definition
In the scope of our work, we define admission control as the process following
which a peer of a VPN overlay can securely join and enrol with a super peer in
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the universal overlay. In Peer-to-Peer networks, bootstrapping a new peer is a
well-known issue,that is, there is a need for the new peer to discover the required
configurations and peers of the overlay to successfully join the network and ac-
cess resources.
5.1.2 Bootstrapping using Server Lists
There are some traditional and commonly used solutions for this issue in peer-
to-peer networks. One solution is to use a public server-based peer lists, where
the address of the public server is either embedded in the P2P clients or is very
well-known. There are some obvious security problems with this approach, for
example, an attacker can compromise all the peer-to-peer overlays by compro-
mising the server. Even without compromising the server, an attacker can just
impersonate the server and feed the clients bad or malicious information that can
be used to compromise the client itself. Lastly, it is difficult to inform and update
the clients of any changes in the server’s address.
5.1.3 Bootstrapping using Peer Caches
Another solution is to use client-based peer caches, that contain information of
the last-known peers. This approach assumes a successful and secure initial
peer-to-peer bootstrap process, which is an assumption that we don’t make in
our approach. Furthermore, the participants of a cloud server in a inter-cloud
environment can join and leave quite rapidly, hence the cached information can
become stale quite quickly. Another problem to consider is that whether you
trust the cached information from a peer in absence of any formal authentication
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process.
5.1.4 Bootstrapping using Random Probing
A yet another solution is to use random address probing to actively find peers.
This is usually done with in the scope of a local area network as the common un-
derlying technique is to use broadcast transmissions. Hence, this is obviously not
suitable for the wide network scope of the inter-cloud environment. Furthermore,
securing broadcast communication protocols usually carry a large performance
penalty. The presence of a malicious impersonate will need to be considered in
this situation as well, as in the peer cache based solution discussed above.
5.1.5 Bootstrapping using Multicast
In this bootstrapping technique, peers discover other peers in their domain by
listening to a well-known global multicast address. This assumes that all partici-
pating peers will be reachable by at least one peer that has multicast connectivity.
In the case where this special peer does not have multicast connectivity, it will
try using directed broadcasts. If directed broadcasts are blocked (due to their
common use in denial-of-service attacks), the peers will only be able to use pre-
viously cache peers until another special peer in the same multicast scope is
introduced to the overlay. As an additional optimization, peers can solicit asyn-
chronous announcement by using expanding ring searches, in which TTL-limited
query requests are sent to the global multicast address and the TTL is increased
gradually until there is a response.
However, regardless of the bootstrapping method being utilised, the require-
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ment and importance of secure admission control is obvious as scalable key man-
agement and secure communication schemes are effective only after the peers
join the overlay in a secure admission process. This is also useful to thwart the
well-known vulnerability of P2P networks to Sybil attacks [56], where a peer or a
collection of peers can claim or impersonate multiple identities in a peer-to-peer
network.
5.2 Threat vectors affecting Inter-Cloud VPN Admis-
sion Control
While the concept and design of structured peer-to-peer overlay networks is
highly robust and scalable, that very scale and flexibility of peer nodes can greatly
increase the exposure of the overlay network to malicious peer nodes. For in-
stance, if a malicious peer node is able to join a VPN overlay, it can place a
malware on the distributed hash tables that can be later shared and run within
the scope of virtual machines comprising of the affected VPN overlay. Thus, the
attacker’s ability to harvest sensitive information and even use the compromised
virtual machines as desired (e.g., bot-nets, email account harvesting, denial of
service etc.) will be significantly more than the compromise of a single host or
an isolated virtual machine. Therefore, in addition of using encrypted tunnels and
secure key and resource sharing schemes, we also have to address the secu-
rity threats the admission control process as this process precedes all the other
processes and protocols in our, and in fact all, communication frameworks.
To come up with an efficient, scalable and secure admission control mech-
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anism for our Inter-Cloud VPN architecture, we consider the following common
security vulnerabilities and attacks that should be addressed to ensure that no
malicious nodes are able to join an overlay network. However, we do not aim
to identify all possible threats and the corresponding solutions; instead, we start
from an analysis of the common types of attacks discussed in the related litera-
ture and discuss them in the context of the admission control in our inter-cloud
virtual private network.
5.2.1 Confidentiality Attacks
All most all of the current commercial and non-commercial cloud IaaS platforms
support multi-tenant operations. This means that multiple users share the same
computation, storage, and network resources but the cloud platforms can logi-
cally distinguish between different users, thus the users do not share or see each
other’s data, processing and network traffic. However, recent research has shown
that it is possible to utilise cross-VM side-channel attacks to extract information
from a target VM running on the same hardware as an attackers VM [134].
This introduces the possibility of VMs of different users sharing the same net-
work resources and the possibility, in our case, for an unauthorised users to sniff
the network traffic of VMs that want to join a VPN overlay. Although the IPsec pro-
tocol utilised by our solution protects against it, this kind of network sniffing can
be timed before the peer has enrolled with the universal overlay and joined a VPN
overlay, effectively before it has the time to use IPsec. Therefore, it will be possi-
ble for the attacker to sniff sensitive data, passwords and meta-data transmitted
or received by a peer, before it gets admitted into a VPN overlay, compromising
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the confidentiality of our solution.
Another possible attack vector is that an attacker can gain unauthorised ac-
cess to a running VM itself by exploiting a known or even zero-day vulnerability in
a software present on the VM or the operating system itself. So even if the VM is
initially trusted at the provisioning stage, it may be compromised later by exploits
that are discovered in it by an attacker. Therefore, it will be possible for the at-
tacker to retrieve and use sensitive data, passwords and meta-data etc. from the
VM storage if it is stored there unencrypted.
5.2.2 Integrity Attacks
In the same vein as the previous discussion, if an attacker is able to modify the
data transmitted between the peers, it should not be able to compromise the
admission control process. For example, if an attacker can modify the content of
a peer’s enrolment request during transit, the super peer should be able to detect
the tempering and discard that request.
5.2.3 Authentication Attacks
It is possible for an attacker to intercept all traffic between a peer and a super
peer and inject its own data instead. This can lead to a man-in-the-middle attack
where the attacker can masquerade as a super peer to the peer and force it to join
a compromised VPN overlay, or the attacker can masquerade as a peer and dupe
the super peer into admitting it into a secure VPN overlay. Lastly, the attacker may
also be able to read all the traffic sent between the communication entities. This
kind of attack is especially easy in wireless environments, where the traffic can
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be easily intercepted by anyone who is equipped with the right tools and is with
in range of communication devices.
5.2.4 Availability Attacks
One of the salient benefits of using structured peer-to-peer model as the core of
our communication framework is that the services it provides have higher robust-
ness against failure. However, denial-of-service attacks are still possible against
individual peer nodes within an overlay if the attacker possesses sufficient re-
sources to carry our a sustained and persistent attack. For example, a network
of malicious peer nodes that is controlled by the same attacker could simultane-
ously launch lookup queries for a particular key in the VPN overlay’s distributed
hash table. This can overload the peer node responsible for the key and even
crash it. However, we can again mitigate these types threats with mass replica-
tion (of key-value pairs) strategies discussed earlier. Therefore, in our research
effort we focus our energies in designing an admission control protocol that stops
the malicious peer nodes from joining the overlay in the first place.
5.3 Security protocol for Inter-Cloud VPN Admis-
sion Control
As mentioned before in Chapter 4, we utilise a VM contextualisation service [13]
to customise and provision VM images on different cloud platforms. To address
the security threats described earlier, we modify the service to embed our peer-
to-peer client and some bootstrapping information in each VM launched by the
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service on the available cloud platforms. Because of this start-up routine, we can
begin from a reasonable assumption that the cloud service or application owner
that wants to establish an Inter-Cloud VPN between its VMs, and the super peers
of the universal overlay, both have already agreed to a secret value or a password
and that secret information is part of the bootstrapping information embedded by
the VM contextualisation service in each VM. So when a VM created by this
process is first started on a cloud platform, it is free of any malware and it has a
trusted and secure P2P client provisioned on it. Therefore, a fresh virtual machine
containing our P2P client has all the pre-requisites present that are required for it
to undergo an overlay admission control process.
5.3.1 The Admission Control Protocol
Our admission control scheme is used when the peer bootstraps for the first time.
It is motivated by the concept of Zero-Knowledge Password Proof (ZKPP), which
is a generic and interactive method for one party (the prover) to prove to another
party (the verifier) that it knows the value of a secret password, without revealing
anything else to the verifier [21]. The use of this concept is very suitable for our
security protocol as it allows a super peer to authenticate itself to a bootstrap peer
without exchanging the password.
5.3.1.1 Using the Embedded Secret
The concept of a basic Zero-Knowledge Password Proof protocol can be ex-
plained in form of a simple interaction between two peers, Alice (A) and Bob
(B). We assume that Alice and Bob share a secret S. Now, to share a secure
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session key among themselves, Alice creates a secure random key K, and sends
it to Bob encrypting it with S, i.e., M = ENCS(K). As Bob already knows the se-
cret S, it can decrypt this message from Alice and retrieve the session key K, i.e.,
K = DECS(M). Now Alice and Bob can use the secure key K for establishing a
secure communication channel between them.
As we can see from the above interaction, the secret S itself is never trans-
mitted on the wire between Alice and Bob, therefore, there is no direct way for an
attacker to sniff it out from the network traffic. However, it is possible for a mali-
cious eavesdropper to save the message M sent by Alice and run a dictionary or
brute force attack against the secret S on it at his leisure. This type of exchange
is susceptible to other kinds of offline and replay attacks as well. Therefore, we
use an enhanced Zero-Knowledge Password Proof protocol based on [151], in
which a Man-in-the-Middle attack cannot be used to obtain enough information
to be able to guess a secret password by brute force, without further interactions
with the peers for each guess.
5.3.1.2 Securing the Embedded Secret
If we consider the possibility that an attacker has somehow stolen sensitive data
about a VPN peer from sources external to the overlay, like the external pass-
word database of the user or client of the service, then he will also be able to
gain admission into the VPN overlay. To cater for this possibility, we modify our
admission control protocol such that instead of using the stored secret password,
we use a password-based key derivation function like scrypt [127] to generate a
new password P from the stored secret password p and a cryptographic salt s,
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and securely erase the stored password p from the VM. The same key derivation
function is used on the super peers to generate the verifier v, which is then stored
in the DHT of the universal overlay.
The inclusion of the key derivation function in our admission control protocol
makes it resistant to a wide range of integrity attacks, from dumb/brute force
attacks to rainbow table attacks. Furthermore, as it this function is designed
to be computationally intensive, thus we can substantially limit the amount of
parallelism that an attacker can use in a sustained attack.
5.3.1.3 The Complete Protocol
In our admission control scheme, the super peer stores the password in the form
of a three element tuple (ServiceID, Password, salt). The ServiceID is the
identifying common attribute of the VMs that together constitute the single cloud
service that is being deployed on multiple cloud platforms. It is represented by a
version 4 Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) [102], and is 128-bits in length.
The salt s is generated as a random number. The private key is generated by
using the SHA-2 hash function in the following manner:-
x =H(s ∣∣ H( ServiceID ∣∣ P ))
The password verifier is generated as,
v = gx mod n
where g is a generator of the multiplicative group and n is a safe prime. The
122
5. Inter-Cloud VPN Admission Control
Table 5.1: Notations for the Inter-Cloud VPN Admission Control protocol
Symbol Explanation
n A large prime number. All computations are performed modulo n
g A primitive root modulo n (often called a generator)
s A random octet string used as the salt
p The peer’s password
P The peer’s password strengthened using a key derivation function
x A private key derived from the password and salt
v The peer’s password verifier
u Random scrambling parameter, publicly revealed
H() One-way hash function e.g. SHA-1, SHA-2 etc.
m ∣∣ n The two quantities m and n concatenated
K Session key
description of other mathematical notations is given in Table 5.1.
The authentication process for admission into the overlay is initiated by the
peer when it is started in its VM. Upon contacting the super peer, the peer re-
ceives the salt stored on the super peer, indexed under its Service ID. After its
reception, the peer can calculate x as its Service ID and password P is already
embedded in the VM. Now the peer generates a random number a, uses it to
calculate A and sends the result to the super peer.
A = ga (mod n)
The super peer does a similar operation to calculate B and also adds the public
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verifier to it, before sending B and a random scrambling parameter u to the peer.
B = (v + gb) (mod n)
Both sides can now construct the shared session key. The peer constructs it as:
SA = (B − g
x)a+ux (mod n)
= (v + gb − gx)a+ux (mod n)
= (gx + gb − gx)a+ux (mod n)
= (gb)a+ux
K = H(SA) (5.1)
The super peer constructs it as:
SB = (A.v
u)b (mod n)
= (ga.gux)b (mod n)
= (ga+ux)b (mod n)
K = H(SB) (5.2)
Both sides now possess the same and secure shared session keyK based on
the respective formulae. To complete the authentication, now they need to prove
to each other that their keys are identical. In order to do so, the peer constructs
the message MA and sends it to the super peer,
MA =H(H(g) ⊕H(n) ∣∣ H(ServiceID) ∣∣ s ∣∣ A ∣∣ B ∣∣ K)
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The super peer will calculate MA using its own K and compare it against the
message received from the peer. If it does not match, the authentication fails.
If it does match, the super peer issues its own proof to the requesting peer by
sending it MB.
MB =H(A ∣∣MA ∣∣K)
The peer will compute the expected response using its own K to verify the au-
thenticity of the server. If it is a match, both parties are now authenticated. The
summarized protocol is given in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: The Admission Control protocol
Peer Super Peer
→ (lookup s, v)
x =H(s,P ) ← s
A = ga A→
← B,u B = v + gb
S = (B − gx)(a+ux) S = (A.vu)b
K =H(S) K =H(S)
MA =H(A,B,K) MA → (verify MA)
(verify MB) ←MB MB =H(A,MA,K)
5.3.2 Protocol Security Analysis
In this section we try to analyse our admission control protocol in terms of its
strength and resistance against the confidentiality, integrity and authentication
attacks described earlier in this chapter.
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5.3.2.1 Mitigating Confidentiality Attacks
In the context of confidentiality attacks, the parameters that a passive attacker
sniffing the network traffic between the peer and super peer node is able to as-
certain are s, A, B and u. However, the knowledge of these parameters is not
enough to formulate the value of S, as that requires the attacker to know the
values of a, b and the verifier component v.
Furthermore, in case of an active attacker that is able to modify the parame-
ters being exchanged between the peer and super peer nodes, the modification
will result in both parties computing different values of S, and subsequently differ-
ent values of the secret key K. This will cause the (verify MA) and (verify MB)
checks to fail on the super peer and the peer node respectively and the modifica-
tion attempt will be detected.
5.3.2.2 Mitigating Integrity Attacks
In the context of integrity attacks, we are able to get strong integrity in our scheme
even when using weak or short passwords p, as the attacker can only attempt one
guess per run of the protocol, making this scheme very resistant to dictionary
and brute-force attacks. Furthermore, the super peer does not need to store
the password, thus even an attacker who has stolen the super peer data cannot
masquerade as the VPN peer unless he first does a brute force search for the
password. Additionally, on the VPN peer side, as mentioned above, the secret is
never stored in plain format, rather it is stored in encrypted form using a strong
key derivation function that is resistant to all known integrity attacks.
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5.3.2.3 Mitigating Authentication Attacks
In the context of authentication attacks, our scheme enables to ensure the proof
of identity of the super peer node due to the use of the verifier v, as only the valid
super peer knows the correct value of v and it is never transmitted on the wire
during the run of the admission control protocol. Thus, a malicious attacker trying
to impersonate the super peer will have to use an incorrect value of v and will
force the peer node to formulate a different secret key K.
Furthermore, after a peer is authenticated and joins the overlay, its session
key is kept in a secure cache and is valid for a brief time period. Our scheme can
utilize previous session keys to generate new session keys to take advantage of
key-continuity and avoiding overloading the authentication system. As the service
or applications owner’s password is deleted from the virtual machine as soon as
it has been used as an input in the password-based key derivation function, an
attacker won’t be able to compromise other VMs of the same user even if he has
been able to gain access to one of the VMs that has been provisioned with the
Peer-to-Peer client. Another key feature of our scheme is that although it uses
some elements of asymmetric encryption, it does not need a trusted third party.
Thus we are able to avoid the overhead of a purely PKI-based scheme.
5.3.2.4 Mitigating Availability Attacks
In the context of availability attacks, an attacker may be able to target a super peer
with a denial-of-service attack (DoS), rendering it unable to receive or process
the admission control mechanism. These types of attacks are very hard to de-
fend against, especially for the distributed DoS attacks (dDoS). Our scheme does
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not specifically defend against these type of attacks, however, most commonly
used approaches in order to mitigate their affects are robust connection/session
management mechanisms, so that each connection/session consumes minimum
resources, and massive replication of services, so that the attack surface is in-
creased substantially for the attacker.
Therefore, our use of structured peer-to-peer overlays as the foundation of
our communication framework is beneficial in this regard as they have in-build
mechanisms for replication of resources like content and key-value pairs of the
distributed hash table.
5.4 Prototype Implementation
We have implemented a working prototype of our Inter-Cloud VPN Admission
Control scheme and integrated it with the overall Inter-Cloud VPN architecture.
In this way, the admission control scheme is available as part of the Peer-to-Peer
ICVPN client, discussed in detail in the previous chapter. Therefore, both the
super peer and peer nodes contain the same implementation of our admission
control scheme, the only difference being that the super peer also contains the
mapping of the cryptographic salt s to the verifier v in its distributed hash table
(DHT of the universal overlay).
This scheme has been implemented using the Java programming language
[59] that can be deployed on Linux-based operating systems [153]. We were mo-
tivated by the following reasons to use Java and Linux as the core technologies for
the prototype development, after suffering from some initial problems with other
technologies and platforms:-
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• Java has a large number of relatively easy-to-use cryptographic and peer-
to-peer protocols and libraries.
• Java has excellent documentation and easily available online community-
based help.
• As it is an open source operating system, we did not have to worry about
licenses.
• Linux offers built-in support for creation and management of private keys,
public keys and other cryptographic parameters in form of OpenSSL crypto
library.
Other than the core components of our communication framework, the imple-
mentation of our core research contributions (mechanisms and protocols) was
also done using open source libraries and APIs. Specifically, we chose the Boun-
cyCastle library [124] to implement the majority of the cryptographic operations
needed for our zero-knowledge password proof based admission control and
Inter-Cloud VPN admission control schemes, as well as the PKI-based alternative
that was required for the comparisons. This was due to the fact that BouncyCas-
tle is one of the most light-weight and extensive cryptographic libraries that is
designed with very strong emphasis on standards compliance and adaptability.
In the same vein, we used the TomP2P library [28] for its implementation of the
Kademlia [114] structured peer-to-peer protocol and the overlay DHT. Addition-
ally, we used the commercially available BT Compute Cloud platform [32], Flexi-
ant FlexiScale cloud platform [66], and a Xen hyper-visor based cloud platform
[17] from ATOS Origin as our experimental test-bed.
129
5. Inter-Cloud VPN Admission Control
5.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we present the results of a series of experiments we conducted to
evaluate the efficiency of our Inter-Cloud VPN admission control protocol, when
used in a service deployed on three different cloud IaaS providers. We evaluate
this efficiency by comparing two variants of our protocol against the standard PKI-
based protocol [22] that is second most commonmethod used to authenticate and
grant admissions in secure peer-to-peer environments. We have intentionally not
compared our scheme against the most common method used for authentication
and admission control i.e., password or shared secret based admission control.
This is due to the fact that even though it is a low-cost and efficient method, the
weaknesses and limitations of systems based on this method are numerous and
well known [128].
5.5.1 Methodology
To evaluate the performance of the Inter-Cloud VPN admission control protocol,
we measure the time taken by a peer to gain admission to the universal overlay.
We have chosen this particular metric as the basis of our evaluation as it encom-
passes the whole life-cycle of the admission control process in a peer-to-peer en-
vironment. We have conducted this evaluation by launching the universal overlay
on BT, Flexiant and ATOS cloud platforms, therefore the super peer nodes sup-
porting the evaluated admission control protocols were running on all the three
test-beds. Thereafter, we started the VPN peer clients on virtual machines on
each cloud platform as well and measured the time taken by them to success-
fully join target super peers on different cloud platforms. These VPN peers also
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supported the evaluated admission control protocols. Repeating the experiments
measuring the joining times from different sources to different destinations gives
us a fair idea of the performance overheads of our admission control scheme, as
all other attributes remain same during the evaluations.
In order to conduct comparative evaluation of our scheme, we conduct the
experiments using three different methods of admission control:-
1. We evaluate the PKI-based method, where the peer uses its RSA private
key to sign its admission request and sends it to a super peer in the universal
overlay. In this scenario, each peer also possesses a principal name and
its own certificate, and also the certificate of the Certificate Authority. The
super peer plays the role of the Certificate Authority, as discussed earlier,
and is thus able to authenticate and admit a valid peer, as it has the record
of the peer’s public key when it had issued that particular peer its certificate.
2. We implement and evaluate the variant of our admission control protocol in
which we do not secure the embedded secret. In this scenario we make use
of a simple password that has been embedded in the peer VM by the VM
contextualisation service at the time of the virtual machine provisioning. The
reason for not securing the embedded secret, as discussed above, is that it
relies on passing it through a password derivation function which is a time-
consuming process and therefore incurs performance penalties. Although it
is an interactive method, we have implemented the protocol in such a way
that all interaction between a peer and the super peer is automated.
3. We implement and evaluate an improvement upon our previous admis-
sion control scheme (ZKPP Admission Control) by strengthening the simple
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password used in it by using a strong key derivation function (scrypt) and
securely erasing the original password from the virtual machine. This safe-
guards the system in the scenario where the password database of the peer
virtual machine might be stolen some time after it has been provisioned on
a cloud platform. Therefore, this method increases the security of the pro-
tocol but we are interested in finding out the performance cost associated
with it.
5.5.2 Experimental Results
We implemented the three admission control schemes, described above, in our
cloud platform test-bed. We evaluate the performance of these designs from a
peer’s perspective, that wants to gain admission in to its peer-to-peer overlay. We
do this by measuring the runtime cost of the admission control phase between
the peer and a super peer, as observed by the peer. We define the runtime cost
of the admission control process as the time duration between the sending of the
admission control request by the peer and the reception of a successful enrolment
response from the super peer. This time is logged by the peer in a log file created
by the P2P client on the host VM.
Fig. 5.1 shows the time duration results of admission control process using
the three methods, for 100 separate trials conducted over a 24-hour period. In
this case, only the BT cloud platform was used as the experimental test-bed.
Only a single cloud platform was used so that we can observe the effects of the
admission control protocol with being affected by network latency issues of an
inter-cloud environment. Network latency does exist in a single cloud platform,
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Admission Control Experiments 
PKI-based Admission Control ICVPN based Admission Control (with scrypt)
ICVPN based Admission Control (without scrypt)
Figure 5.1: Duration of the admission control process for 100 trial instances using
the PKI-based and ICVPN methods, on a single cloud platform (BT)
but it is typically very less (around 2.5 ms) and with negligible jitter.
We modified the P2P VPN client so that the same peer is able to make admis-
sion control requests using the three different authentication mechanisms. Sim-
ilarly, the super peer is able to handle all three types of requests by launching
a new thread for the processing of each request. We can see from the graph
in Fig. 5.1 that, on average, the duration of the admission control process us-
ing the PKI-based approach is much greater (1270.41 milli-seconds) than that for
our Inter-Cloud VPN schemes, with or without using the scrypt key strengthening
function (220.65 milli-seconds and 58.59 milli-seconds respectively). Similarly,
the variation in the time duration results in case of the former is much greater
than that for the later scheme.
Fig. 5.2 shows the time duration results of admission control process using the
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Admission Control Experiments 
PKI-based Admission Control ICVPN based Admission Control (with scrypt)
ICVPN based Admission Control (without scrypt)
Figure 5.2: Duration of the admission control process for 100 trial instances using
the PKI-based and ICVPN methods, between BT and Flexiant cloud platform
three methods, for 100 separate trials conducted over a 24-hour period. In this
case, two different cloud platform were used as the experimental test-bed, i.e.,
the BT and Flexiant cloud platforms. This was done so that for this set of trial we
can observe the effects network latency on the admission control process. The
super peer VMs were running on the BT cloud platform and the peer nodes on
the Flexiant cloud platform.
We can see from the graph in Fig. 5.2 that, similar to the single cloud plat-
form trials, on average the duration of the admission control process using the
PKI-based approach is much greater (1368.18 milli-seconds) than that for our
Inter-Cloud VPN schemes, with or without using the scrypt key strengthening
function (254.83 milli-seconds and 77.17 milli-seconds respectively). Similarly,
the variation in the time duration results in case of the former is much greater
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Admission Control Experiments 
PKI-based Admission Control ICVPN based Admission Control (with scrypt)
ICVPN based Admission Control (without scrypt)
Figure 5.3: Duration of the admission control process for 100 trial instances using
the PKI-based and ICVPN methods, between BT and ATOS cloud platform
Fig. 5.3 shows the time duration results of admission control process using the
three methods, for 100 separate trials conducted over a 24-hour period. In this
case too, two different cloud platform were used as the experimental test-bed,
i.e., the BT and ATOS cloud platforms. This was done for the same reason as
described in the case of the previous results. The super peer VMs were running
on the BT cloud platform and the peer nodes on the ATOS test-bed.
We can see from the graph in Fig. 5.3 that on average the duration of the ad-
mission control process using the PKI-based approach is much greater (1575.03
milli-seconds) than that for our Inter-Cloud VPN schemes, with or without us-
ing the scrypt key strengthening function (438.97 milli-seconds and 241.98 milli-
seconds respectively). Similarly, the variation in the time duration results in case
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of the former is much greater than that for the later scheme.
5.5.3 Results Analysis
Given the known stable network latency between the different cloud platforms
available to us, we profiled the implementation of the PKI based design and its
cryptographic libraries at the code level, in order shed some light on the reasons
behind its large overhead in terms of both time and jitter.
Table 5.3: Average time taken by the admission control trials
Admission Control MechanismsCloud
Platforms PKI ICVPN (with scrypt) ICVPN (without scrypt)
BT 1270.41 ms 220.65 ms 58.59 ms
BT - Flexiant 1368.18 ms 254.83 ms 77.17 ms
BT - ATOS 1575.03 ms 438.97 ms 241.98 ms
The main reason for the relative slowness of the PKI-based design is the re-
quired use of cryptographically secure random number generation in this method.
This introduces the largest time and jitter penalty for our PKI-based measure-
ments, as the peer has to wait for system events to gather enough entropy from
entropy sources like disk reads, network activity, mouse movement, key presses,
etc. to generate this kind of random number. In a typical cloud hosted virtual
machine, these events are usually quite stable or uniform (as in case of disk and
network activity), or totally absent (as in case of mouse and keyboard activity).
Therefore, it takes a much longer time to generate the required random number
of reasonable strength, and increasing the overhead of a PKI based solution as a
result.
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We also note that the second method (ZKPP+scrypt), although being more
secure than the third method, adds quite a performance overhead on the ad-
mission control duration. Thus, although the Inter-Cloud VPN admission control
method takes about 162 milli-seconds more than the less-secure ZKPP based
method, it is still approximately 82% more efficient than a PKI-based solution.
The cumulative average of all the experiment trials are given in Table 5.3.
Furthermore, the time cost of the third admission control solution can be fur-
ther reduced by adjusting the CPU cost, memory cost and parallelisation cost
parameters of the scrypt algorithm, or even by using a simpler password strength-
ening algorithm other than scrypt e.g., bcrypt, PBKDF2 or even SHA-1.
5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have given a description of the design and implementation
details of our attempt to solve the problem of secure admission of a peer of a VPN
overlay. We discussed some of the traditional solutions of this problem and then
explained why they are not really suitable for an inter-cloud model, mainly due
to the lack of authentication of the peer nodes trying to join an overlay network.
So we try to come up with an efficient solution, that should be able to protect our
communication with minimal performance overhead, as well as be integrate-able
with the complex and heterogeneous environment of the inter-cloud.
We started by describing the threat vectors for Inter-Cloud VPN admission
control process. We considered the attacks on confidentiality of the communica-
tion process, especially as unauthorised users might be able to sniff the network
traffic of VMs that want to join a VPN overlay. So we have to make sure that its
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not possible for the attacker to sniff sensitive data and meta-data transmitted or
received by a peer, before it gets admitted into a VPN overlay. We also consid-
ered attacks on the integrity of the data communicated between the peers. So an
attacker should not be able to modify the content of a peer’s enrolment request
during transit. We also considered attacks on the identity and availability of the
peers and super peers.
We then give the details of our security protocol for the admission control pro-
cess, which is used when the peer goes through the bootstraps process for the
first time. We have based the core of the protocol on zero knowledge password
proof, which is very suitable for our security model as it allows a peer to authen-
ticate itself to a bootstrapping peer without exchanging the password. Further-
more, it is resistant to dictionary attacks and it does not need a trusted third party.
We further modified this scheme such that instead of using the stored password in
the zero-knowledge password proof, we use scrypt as the key derivation function.
We describe the implementation of this scheme in our system and measured
the time taken by a peer to gain admission to the universal overlay for its evalu-
ation. We used three different methods for authentication to do this comparison,
which are, PKI-based method using RSA algorithm, the zero-knowledge pass-
word proof method, and the zero-knowledge password proof method strength-
ened with scrypt. We showed the time taken by the admission control process for
100 experimental instances using these three methods, with the zero-knowledge
password proof method performing the best and the PKI-based method the worst.
In the next chapter, we describe in detail how we solve the problem of secure
service based resource discovery in our framework. This is a well known issue
in the peer-to-peer overlays and the data about a peer’s resources has to be
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obtained in such a manner that this information remains private and confidential
between the valid peers of a VPN overlay. We describe our threat model for this
problem in detail and then describe the security model that gives us the desired
solution by using the functional cryptography based methods. At the end we show
the performance evaluation of our solution again the traditional PKI model.
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Inter-Cloud VPN Secure Resource
Discovery
6.1 Resource Discovery
Resource discovery is the process by which the users or client of a distributed
system are able to search for resources required for their operations. Typically
these resources are in form of services and devices etc. and are advertised or
hosted in a networked environment by describing some of their attributes e.g.,
keywords, URL (Universal Resource Locator), URI (Universal Resource Identi-
fier), and other forms of identifiers [86]. Usually specialised services, known as
directory services, are used to store all the information related to the available re-
sources, as well as implementing the functionality of resolving user queries [85].
However, most of the current resource discovery efforts tend to focus on expres-
sive resource descriptions and extensive query predicates [3], [11], [14], and [91].
These efforts may differ in the way in which they name resources and how these
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names are resolved to the target network location. However, in one way or an-
other, all resource discovery mechanisms utilise attribute-based naming schemes
and semi-structured resource descriptions [2].
As we have already discussed in the earlier chapters, most structured peer-
to-peer networks use a distributed hash table (DHT) that handles resource place-
ment and discovery, as well as ensuring a bounded number of hops for every
search query. However, an important issue still facing resource discovery mecha-
nisms, especially in distributed and peer-to-peer environments, is how to provide
resource discovery techniques that allow their users to locate the resources of
their interest securely, but still efficiently, especially in large-scale environments
like the inter-cloud.
6.2 Service based Resource Discovery
In the Inter-Cloud VPN solution, after a peer in a VPN overlay has been success-
fully and secure bootstrapped using the scheme described above in Chapter 5,
it needs to discover resources like VM ID, IP address and port numbers of the
neighbouring peers in its overlay in order to construct IPsec tunnels between it-
self and the peers it wants to communicate with. These required resources have
to be obtained in such a manner that this information remains private and confi-
dential between the valid peers of a VPN overlay. Therefore, we are interested in
devising a resource discovery scheme that is secure, but it also has to be scalable
as we are operating in a decentralised environment.
As may be recalled from Chapter 3, Section 3.2, we make use of the Kademlia
protocol [114] to provide us with the basic functionalities of a peer-to-peer overlay.
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Two of its four basic operations can be used for the purposes of resource discov-
ery in our solution, namely FIND NODE and FIND VALUE. Therefore, a peer
can send FIND NODE requests those super peers whose contact information
has been embedded in the virtual machine by the VM contextualisation service.
In the case of the absence of this contact information or to use more up-to-date
information, it can also send the FIND NODE request to the super peer it has
already communicated with in the admission control process.
The advantage of the later method is that as every peer of a VPN overlay
has to go through the admission control process, the super peers responsible for
handling admission control can keep a running list of the peers currently present
in a VPN overlay in the DHT of the universal overlay. However, both of these
resource discovery methods have some security issues discussed below.
6.3 Threat vectors affecting Inter-Cloud Resource
Discovery
Most of the directory services currently used for the purposes of resource dis-
covery do not have security primitive built-in in their architecture. This is mostly
due to the fact that these are usually intended to be used with in the local and
internal scope of an organisation, which is assumed to be a trusted and secure
environment. Whenever there are security requirements, these services fall back
to the use of SSL/TLS protocols, or some variant of them, in order to fulfil those
requirements [84], [51].
However, due to the inter-cloud scope of our working environment, we are
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aware of the threats of malicious attackers trying to compromise the system using
attacks like eavesdropping on network traffic, spoofing of communication end-
points, tampering with in-flight packets (Man-in-the-Middle attack), and denial of
service etc. Although we do use some encryption techniques for authentication
and admission control purposes in our Inter-Cloud VPN framework, as discussed
in detail in Chapter 5, encryption alone is insufficient to deal with all of these
attacks to compromise the security of resource discovery.
6.3.1 Information Confidentiality
Eavesdropping attacks can be targeted at the network traffic between the virtual
machines, either in a single cloud platform or between multiple cloud platforms.
This can be done quite easily using tools called network sniffers or network anal-
ysers, e.g., tcpdump [90], Wireshark [125], network taps etc., which can be either
software or hardware. These types of attacks can be thwarted by encrypting the
traffic sent between the communicating components of a cloud service, hence
the use of IPsec tunnels to encrypt the connections between the peers of a VPN
overlay.
6.3.2 Traffic Tampering
This an active version of the eavesdropping attacks, where the attacker is placed
between the communicating entities and can either modify the packets they are
sending to each other or even impersonate them both. Furthermore, the attacker
may even choose to not deliver the packets at all, or he may deliver the packets
out-of-order. Lastly, the attacker may also be able to read all the traffic sent
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between the communication entities. This kind of attack is especially easy in
wireless environments, where the traffic can be easily intercepted by anyone who
is equipped with the right tools and is with in range of communication devices.
To handle this class of attacks, we can again use protocols based on symmet-
ric and asymmetric encryption techniques, that provide the features authenticated
key exchange and mutual authentication. These protocols typically assume that
the identities have already been established for all the participants, in other words
the problem of spoofing has been handled, which might be difficult to achieve in
a large network.
6.3.3 Denial of Service
In this type of attack, the attacker attempts to deny the users access to the re-
source discovery service. This can be done by either inundating the service with
a large number of simultaneously requests, which will overload the system and
cause it to crash. It can also be accomplished by exploiting a vulnerability in the
service itself to compromise its operation. Or it can be done in the form of a Man-
in-the-Middle attack as well where the attacker just does not forward the traffic
between some or all of the communicating entities.
These types of attacks are very hard to defend against, especially for the
distributed DoS attacks. Most commonly used approaches in order to mitigate
their affects are robust connection/session management mechanisms, so that
each connection/session consumes minimum resources, and massive replication
of services, so that the attack surface is increase for the attacker.
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6.3.4 Peer Spoofing
To join a peer-to-peer overlay, each peer needs to acquire a unique identification
number called Peer Identification number (PeerID). In most structured P2P
systems, this is done by the peer itself by choosing a random number from a
large identity space. For instance, Kademlia protocol assigns a random 160-bit
string to each peer. The content in the DHT also has a 160-bit string as its ID,
which is known as ContentID or infohash. However, this approach is vulnerable
to Sybil attacks [56], the basic idea of which is that an attacker can create and


























Number of Fake Peers = �/(max(�, log � ) − 1) 
N = 100 N = 1000 N = 10000 N = 100000 N = 1000000
Figure 6.1: No. of fake peers required to intercept all inter-peer communication in
a Kademlia overlay of size N
The attacker can assign or manipulate the false peers’ PeerID at will, and
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thus subvert the functioning of the peer-to-peer overlay. Due to the k -bucket
mechanism used in Kademlia, an attacker can effectively intercept peer mes-
sages if he has at least one false peer among every peer’s k closest neighbours.
This means that an attacker only has to injectN/(k − 1) false peers in an overlay.
However, we know that the average number of hops in routing a message in a
Kademlia overlay isO(log(N)). As k ≤ 8 in most default deployments of Kadem-
lia, O(log(N)) will become larger than k as the number of peers in an overlay
increase. Therefore, a better calculation of the number of false peers required in
an overlay is N/(max(k, log(N))) − 1.
6.4 Security protocol design for Inter-Cloud VPN Re-
source Discovery
A common way of dealing with this issue it to use some trusted authority to al-
locate peer IDs to the participating peers and the peers validate each other by
querying the central authority with a validation request. In our solution model, it
can work by designating a stable super peer as the Certificate Authorities (CA) for
a VPN overlay’s peer nodes. The CA can assign peer IDs to the peers and signs
a certificate that binds the serviceID of the cloud service or application making
use of our solution and peer ID within the public certificate of the peer for a limited
time duration. The peer then can use this signed certificate to authenticate itself
with other peers in the overlay. However, using this Trusted Third Party (TTP)
model to validate peers and allocate them their identities can introduce substan-
tial communicational and computational overhead, especially as the number of
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peers in the overlay increases.
6.4.1 Proposed Solution
We propose a decentralized solution that overcomes the above mentioned scala-
bility problems by utilizing a functional encryption based scheme [49]. In a generic
functional encryption scheme, a decryption key describes a function of the en-
crypted data to the user. This function F (⋅, ⋅) is modelled as a Turing Machine
and an authority possessing a master secret key (msk) can generate a key skk
that can be used to compute the function F (k, ⋅) on some encrypted data. To
describe it more formally but briefly, a functional encryption scheme (FE) for a
functionality F dened over (K,X) is a sequence of four algorithms (setup, key-
gen, encryption, decryption) satisfying the following correctness condition for all
k ∈ K and x ∈ X is given in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Four-tuple Functional Encryption
Sequence Explanation
setup(1λ)→ (pp,msk) Generate public and master secret key pair
keygen(mk,k)→ sk Generate secret key for k
enc(pp, x)→ c Encrypt message x
dec(sk, c)→ y Use sk to decrypt c
For Inter-Cloud VPN, we employ a special case of Functional Encryption which
falls under the category of systems known as the predicate encryption schemes
with public index. For our scheme we make use of the system defined in [158]
as Identity-Based Signatures, and in [80] as Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE),
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where the decision that which users can decrypt a ciphertext is based on the
attributes and policies associated with the plaintext message and the user. We
have discussed the basic background of these systems in Chapter 3. In this
scheme an authority creates secret keys for the users of the system based on
attributes or policies for each user and anyone can encrypt a plaintext message
by incorporating the appropriate attributes or policies in the scheme. There are
two versions of the ABE, Key Policy ABE and Ciphertext-Policy ABE.
6.4.1.1 Key Policy Attribute based Encryption (KP-ABE)
In KP-ABE, attributes are assigned to a ciphertext when creating the ciphertext
and policies are assigned to users/keys by an authority which created the keys. A
key provides an access formula that operates over the set of attributes that must
evaluate to true for decryption to yield the plaintext message. A key can decrypt
only those ciphertexts whose attributes satisfy the policy.
6.4.1.2 Ciphertext-Policy Attribute based Encryption (CP-ABE)
In CP-ABE, the users of the system are assigned different attributes and each
user is issued a key from an authority for its set of attributes. The ciphertext
contains a policy (which is a Boolean predicate over the attribute space) and if
the users attribute set satisfies the policy, they can use their key to decrypt the
ciphertext. Another attractive feature of this scheme is that it is collusion resistant
i.e. multiple users cannot pool their attributes together to decrypt a ciphertext.
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6.4.1.3 Bilinear Pairing
Most of the Functional Encryption schemes are based on Pairing-based Cryptog-
raphy (PBC) [98], which uses a pairing between elements of two cryptographic
groups to a third group in order to formulate cryptographic systems. If the com-
bining of elements of the two groups yields an element of the third group, that is
linear in each of its arguments, then this pairing is called a Bilinear Pairing.
In groups constituting a bilinear mapping, for example the Weil pairing [159]
or Tate pairing [150], generalizations of the computational DiffieHellman problem
are considered to be impractical while the simpler decisional DiffieHellman prob-
lem can be solved using the pairing function. Bilinear pairings have been used
to design many cryptographic systems for which no other practical implementa-
tion was known to exist, and these include the Functional Encryption schemes
like Identity-based Encryption and the Attribute-based Encryption. The Bilinear
Pairing is often formally defined as follows in most cryptography literature:-
Let r be a prime number.
Let G1 and GT be cyclic groups of prime order r.
Let G2 be a group, which is not necessarily cyclic, where each element has order
dividing r.
Let P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2 be the generators of G1 and G2 respectively.
A bilinear pairing e on (G1, GT ) is a computable map,
e ∶ G1 × G2 → GT
for which the following is true:
1. Bi-linearity: e(P a, Qb) = e(P, Q)ab ∀ a, b ∈ Z
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2. Non-Degeneracy: e(P, Q) ≠ 1
3. Computability: e has to be efficiently computable
6.4.2 Secure Resource Discovery
Once a peer has joined its overlay network, it needs to discover its neighbours
and the resources offered by them, to establish secure IPsec tunnels. After the
establishment of the tunnels, the deployed cloud service or application will be
able communicate securely with its different components. In order to achieve
this secure resource discovery process, we have designed the following protocol
scheme based on the Functional Encryption predicates discussed earlier in the
section. A simplified step-wise description of the scheme is as follows:-
1. A super peer sets up its own Master Secret ms and Public Parameters pp.
2. The super peer generates a private key for itself using the ServiceID and its
own PeerID as the public key i.e. PubSP = ServiceID ∧ SuperPeerID,
for each service the super peer is managing.
3. The VPN peer requests for pp on boot up from the super peer.
4. The VPN peer sends a Provisioning Request to super peer, encrypted using
the super peer’s public key (PubSP )
5. The super peer issues a private key to the VPN peer encrypted by its own pri-
vate key, against the public keyPubV PN =VMID ∧ PeerID ∧ ServiceID
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6. The super peer inserts the VPN peer’s public key in the universal overlay DHT
to keep a record of issued private keys;
key(ServiceID) = value(List of VMID)
7. For each peer i, the super peer adds its public key in its VPN overlay ;
key(VMID i) = value(PubV PNi)
8. The VPN peer requests list of other peers from super peer, which returns the
result of key(ServiceID), encrypted usingPubV PN = PeerID ∧ ServiceID
This protocol and its security features are discussed in detail in the following
sections:
6.4.2.1 System Setup
Most of the Functional Encryption based techniques like Identity-based Cryptog-
raphy and Attribute-based Cryptography rely on a trusted third party that is tasked
with the generation of private keys for the whole system. This trusted third party is
typically called Private Key Generator (PKG). Before any encryption or decryption
can take place, the PKG must also generate a master private key and a master
public key. This is denoted by the setup(1λ) function in Table 6.1. In our protocol
we denote these credentials asms and pp respectively. The PKG is only involved
in the initial phase of the process and it is not required to be continually involved
in the normal operation of the Functional Encryption mechanisms after the keys
have been generated.
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In the Inter-Cloud VPN architecture, we can use the super peer nodes as a
distributed PKG, as these nodes are also mainly used for the initial management
and peer bootstrapping processes. In case of multiple super peers acting as the
PKG, we can utilise standard techniques like threshold cryptography to distribute
the PKG functionality among the participating super peers. This will ensure that
ms is not available on a single super peer, thus enhancing security of the master
private key as well as avoiding a single point-of-failure.
The master public key pp is put on the DHT storage of the Universal Overlay by
the super peer as a publicly accessible parameter, indexed against the ServiceID
of the VPN overlay for which it is required. Thus each ms and pp pair is unique
and bound to a single VPN overlay, and hence to the individual cloud service
that is to be deployed on multiple cloud platforms. This is to ensure the security
compartmentalisation of VPN overlays, and as a result the deployed cloud service
as well, so that they do not share the same security parameters.
6.4.2.2 Key Generation
When a peer bootstraps and registers with the super peer, the super peer with
the PKG functionality has to generate the peer’s private key based on its three
attributes. These three attributes that the super peer requires are its VMID ,
PeerID, and ServiceID. The VMID of a peer is globally unique and is assigned
to its host VM by the hyper-visor or the cloud platform that launched the VM. It is
not generally possible the change its value from inside the VM as it is not stored
in the VM, rather it resides only on the hyper-visor running the VM or in some
cases the cloud platform can store it as well. It is also difficult to guess as it is
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usually a long random number, e.g., in case of BT cloud platform it is a 128 bit
number.
However, the peer can query the its hyper-visor or the cloud platform for its
value and then send it to the super peer securely by encrypting it with the super
peer’s public key. A method for securely querying a hyper-visor or the cloud plat-
form for a VMID is usually provided by the vendor in form of an API call. The
hyper-visors and the cloud platforms can also ascertain the source of this query
and only supply the valid results if the query originates from the VM itself. The
other attributes of PeerID and ServiceID have been already discussed in the
last chapter. In order to construct the super peer’s public key, the peer requires
to know the attributes of pp, SuperPeerID, and ServiceID. The latter two of
these are conveniently already embedded in the VM image itself, whereas the
pp attributed can be obtained from the universal overlay DHT at run time, as it is
indexed against a well-known key, i.e., ServiceID.
6.4.2.3 Key Distribution
In the traditional Functional Encryption mechanisms, the PKG will send the user
this private key via a secure side channel. In the Inter-Cloud VPN architecture,
however, we can take advantage of the universal overlay DHT and the private key
of the super peer itself to streamline this key distribution process to the peers. In
our design, the super peer node can generate a private key for itself using the
same process as described above. In fact this step needs to take place before
any key distribution occurs for the VPN peers in the secure resource discovery
process. The attributes that it uses for this purpose are its own PeerID, which in
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this case is called SuperPeerID, and the ServiceID of the cloud service being
deployed.
Now possessing its own private key, the super peer can sign the private key
it generates for the requesting peers. As the ServiceID is a required attribute in
the super peer’s public key, and its knowledge is private to the valid peers running
in the VMs where this information was embedded, thus only the valid peers are
able to construct the super peer’s public key and able to decrypt and acquire their
private keys from the PKG super peer.
6.4.2.4 Public Key Repository
Along with issuing the peers with their private keys, the super peer also builds
a repository for the public keys, in the form of the conditional attributes against
which a particular private key was generated. Each record in this repository is
kept in the form of a key-value pair in the VPN overlay DHT. The key used for
this purpose is the VMID i of the VM on which the peer is running, and the value
against this key is the public key of the same peer PubV PNi . Also, this value is
encrypted by the super peer using its private key before placing it in the DHT, so
that only a peer that is in possession of the super peer’s valid public key is able
to read it.
This feature offers the functionality, to any other peer in the VPN overlay, of
uploading or sharing data through the DHT in such a way that only the intended
recipient peer is able to read it. All it needs it order to achieve this goal is to know
the VMID i of the intended recipient and it will be able to get its public key using
the resource discovery lookup operation on the DHT. Encrypting the data to be
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shared with this public key will ensure that only the intended recipient is able to
read it, as only that peer’s private key can be used to decrypt it.
6.4.2.5 Peer Address Resolution
However, in order to communicate directly with the recipient peer, the sending
peer must have the knowledge of its IP address or the DNS name, as the VMID is
the virtual machine UUID that cannot be used itself as a logical network address.
This problem is overcome again by using a simple API call provided by all hyper-
visors and cloud platforms vendors, which returns a virtual machines IP address
or its DNS name if queried with its VMID . Furthermore, in cloud platforms where
each virtual machines is assigned at least one public IP address by default (e.g.,
Flexiant), we can use this public IP address as the value of the VMID parameter,
instead of the virtual machine UUID. This will further streamline the process of the
acquiring a neighbouring peer’s public key as it will eliminate the need of making
an API call to the cloud platform.
6.4.2.6 Neighbour Peer Discovery
To keep a record of peers that have successfully bootstrapped and have been
issued their private keys, the super peer maintains a running list of these peers
in the universal overlay’s DHT. This list is composed of the concatenated VMID
parameters of all the peers currently active in the VPN overlay, and is indexed
in the DHT against the ServiceID parameter as its key. As this list is stored in
the universal overlay, the VPN peers cannot access it directly, as the resource
discovery mechanism is local to each overlay network. The super peer is also
155
6. Inter-Cloud VPN Secure Resource Discovery
make use of this list, as it helps it to monitor the population of the VPN peers.
Therefore, if it sees a trend of increase in this population, it can start up more
super peer’s in the universal overlay in order to handle the increased work load,
or vice versa.
Therefore, if a VPN peer wants to get the list of all peers in its VPN overlay,
it has to query it from the super peer. On reception of this query, the super peer
will send the list to the the requesting VPN peer, encrypted with the public key of
that peer that it has on record. In this way, on the valid peer will be able to get the
list of all its neighbour peers by decrypting it with its private key. As mentioned
in the previous paragraph, if the cloud platform is assigning public IP addresses
to its virtual machines, then this will be a list of public IP addresses of the all
the peers currently active in the overlay. This will greatly simplify the process of
discovering all the neighbouring peers in a VPN overlay, that is, a peer wishing
to communicate with all the peers in its overlay will be able to acquire their IP
addresses using just one DHT lookup operation.
6.5 Prototype Implementation
We have implemented a working prototype of our Inter-Cloud VPN Secure Re-
source Discovery (ICVPN SRD) protocol and integrated it with the overall Inter-
Cloud VPN architecture. In this way, our Secure Resource Discovery scheme is
available as part of the Peer-to-Peer ICVPN client, whose design and architec-
ture has been discussed in detail chapter 4. Therefore, all the super peer and
peer nodes contain the same implementation of our Secure Resource Discovery
scheme.
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This scheme has been implemented using the Java programming language
[59] that can be deployed on Linux-based operating systems [153]. We were mo-
tivated by the following reasons to use Java and Linux as the core technologies for
the prototype development, after suffering from some initial problems with other
technologies and platforms:-
• Java has a large number of relatively easy-to-use cryptographic and peer-
to-peer protocols and libraries.
• Java has excellent documentation and easily available online community-
based help.
• As it is an open source operating system, we did not have to worry about
licenses.
• Linux offers built-in support for creation and management of private keys,
public keys and other cryptographic parameters in form of OpenSSL crypto
library.
Other than the core components of our communication framework, the imple-
mentation of our core research contributions (mechanisms and protocols) was
also done using open source libraries and APIs. Specifically, we chose the Boun-
cyCastle library [124] to implement the majority of the cryptographic operations
needed for the PKI-based alternative P2P resource discovery scheme that was
required for the comparisons. This was due to the fact that BouncyCastle is one
of the most light-weight and extensive cryptographic libraries that is designed with
very strong emphasis on standards compliance and adaptability.
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To implement the functional encryption schemes, especially the CP-ABE and
IBE related functions, we used the cpabe [26] and libfenc crypto libraries. These
are the only extensible libraries that offer implementations for Attribute-Based and
Identity-based encryption schemes. An isue that we encountered at this step of
the implementation was that these libraries are implemented in C programming
language [96] whereas all of other development code was in Java. Therefore, we
had to implement wrappers functions to call the native C code from the Java using
Java Native Interface (JNI) [73]. Although this is not the most efficient and seam-
less approach, this was the only option available to use other than implementing
the complete libraries in Java.
In the same vein, we used the TomP2P library [28] for its implementation of the
Kademlia [114] structured peer-to-peer protocol and the overlay DHT. Additionally,
we used the commercially available BT Compute Cloud platform [32], Flexiant
FlexiScale cloud platform [66], and a Xen hyper-visor based cloud platform [17]
from ATOS Origin as our experimental test-bed.
6.6 Evaluation Methodology
One of the standard metrics to be measured in order to analyse the performance
of a resource discover mechanism is the latency of a resource lookup operation.
Therefore, we also focus to design and conduct experiments that enable us to
accurately measure the time taken by our secure resource discovery protocol to
find and return a set of resources. In case of solutions based on peer-to-peer
networks, such as ours, this includes the time required for each peer to process
the lookup query, as well as the time required to establish connection to the next
158
6. Inter-Cloud VPN Secure Resource Discovery
peer to whom the lookup query is to be forwarded, in case the required data
is not found in the current peer. In such environments, the time required for a
lookup operation increases with the increase in the number of peers in the overlay
network.
6.6.1 Cost of DHT Lookups
However, we can remove the cost of the DHT lookups from our measurements
as their theoretical overhead is known to be O log(N) for Kademlia. This means
that we will get a fixed value of latency for a particular value of N . But due
to the nature of actual runtime experiments, including the measurement of this
metric will add unhelpful noise to the results, as we know that the value of N
can actually vary during the life-time of a peer-to-peer overlay. Furthermore, the
replication and intelligent routing mechanisms implemented by the peer-to-peer
protocol also affect the measurement of this metric.
6.6.2 PKI-based Design for Comparison
As mentioned earlier, one of the main overheads in peer-to-peer overlays is re-
lated to the performance of the resource discovery lookup operations after the
peers have bootstrapped. Securing this process further adds to this overhead
but in an effort to characterise the effect of our secure resource discovery mech-
anism, we compare it with an alternate design of a PKI-based secure resource
discovery system, like the one described in SDS [48].This alternative design uses
the traditional hybrid of asymmetric and symmetric cryptography. However, we
cannot directly compare our results with the ones provided by SDS due a num-
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ber of architectural and operational differences. For example, SDS is based on
the client-server architecture, it uses a global multicast address for the search
purposes of service discovery and its experiments are run on physical hardware
whose specifications are very different to the VMs used in our test-bed cloud
platforms. Therefore, we take the basic design of a PKI based architecture and
implement and evaluate it in our own test-bed environment.
In the PKI based design, a principal name and a X.509v3 certificate is as-
sociated with every peer, which can be used to prove the peer’s identity. The
certificates are supposed to be signed by a well-known Certificate Authority (CA),
whose own public key is supposed to be known by every peer. In our implemen-
tation, we enhance a super peer with the functionality of a Certificate Authority.
Each peer is issued a signed certificate upon authenticated completion of the
bootstrapping process. The public certificates of the all the peers in the overlay
are stored in the overlay DHT, indexed against their ServiceID, so that the peers
can easily query for and receive any other peer’s public certificate. A peer can
now publish or share any data on its overlay’s DHT by encrypting it with its private
key. Similarly, a peer can query the overlay DHT with resource discovery requests
and get the resulting data back which can then be decrypted by the data-owning
peer’s public key.
6.6.3 Experimental Results
We implemented both the Functional Encryption based secure resource discov-
ery design and the PKI based secure resource discovery design on our cloud
platform test-bed. We evaluate the performance of these two designs by measur-
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ing the runtime cost of their resource discovery operations. We define the runtime
cost for both designs as the time duration between the start and end of a secure























Secure resource discovery experiments 
PKI-based Approach FENC-based Approach
Figure 6.2: Secure resource discovery for 100 runtime trials between PKI and
Functional Encryption based approaches in ICVPN, on a single cloud platform
Fig.6.2 shows the results of doing a secure resource discovery lookup op-
eration for 100 separate trials, conducted over a 24-hour period. In this case,
a single cloud platform was used as the experimental test-bed. We deployed
four VMs on this test-bed, one pair installed with the super peer and peer us-
ing the PKI based resource discovery approach and the other pair installed with
the super peer and peer using the Functional Encryption based resource discov-
ery approach. We can see from the graph that, on average, the runtime of the
secure resource discovery process using the PKI-based design is much greater
(1313.52 milli-seconds) than that for our Functional Encryption based scheme
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(338.81 milli-seconds). Similarly, the variation in the time duration results in case























Secure resource discovery experiments 
PKI-based Approach FENC-based Approach
Figure 6.3: Secure resource discovery for 100 runtime trials between PKI and
Functional Encryption based approaches in ICVPN, between BT and Flexiant
cloud platform
Similarly, Fig.6.3 shows the results of doing a secure resource discovery lookup
operation for 100 separate trials, conducted over a 24-hour period. In this case,
two different cloud platform were used as the experimental test-bed, i.e., the BT
and Flexiant cloud platforms. Again, we deployed four VMs on this test-bed, one
pair installed with the super peer and peer using the PKI based resource dis-
covery approach and the other pair installed with the super peer and peer using
the Functional Encryption based resource discovery approach. The super peer
VMs were hosted on the BT cloud platform and the peer nodes on the Flexiant
test-bed.
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We can see from the graph in Fig.6.3 that, similar to the single cloud platform
trials, on average the runtime of the secure resource discovery process using the
PKI-based design is much greater (1373.47 milli-seconds) than that for our Func-
tional Encryption based scheme (368.09 milli-seconds). Similarly, the variation in
























Secure resource discovery experiments 
PKI-based Approach FENC-based Approach
Figure 6.4: Secure resource discovery for 100 runtime trials between PKI and
Functional Encryption based approaches in ICVPN, between BT and ATOS cloud
platform
Lastly, Fig.6.4 shows the results of doing a secure resource discovery lookup
operation for 100 separate trials, conducted over a 24-hour period. In this case
as well, two different cloud platform were used as the experimental test-bed, i.e.,
the BT and ATOS cloud platforms. Here too we deployed four VMs on these
test-beds, one pair installed with the super peer and peer using the PKI based
resource discovery approach and the other pair installed with the super peer and
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peer using the Functional Encryption based resource discovery approach. We
again hosted the super peer nodes on the BT cloud platform, and the peer nodes
on the ATOS test-bed.
We can see from the graph in Fig.6.4 that, similar to the single cloud platform
trials, on average the runtime of the secure resource discovery process using the
PKI-based design is much greater (1615.66 milli-seconds) than that for our Func-
tional Encryption based scheme (578.22 milli-seconds). Similarly, the variation in
the time duration results in case of the former is still much greater than that for
the later scheme.
6.6.4 Results Analysis
Given the known stable network latency between the different cloud platforms
available to us, we profiled the implementation of the PKI based design and its
cryptographic libraries at the code level, in order shed some light on the rea-
sons behind its large overhead in terms of both time and jitter. The main reason
for the relative slowness of the PKI-based design is the required use of crypto-
graphically secure random number generation in this method. This introduces the
largest time and jitter penalty for our PKI-based measurements, as the peer has
to wait for system events to gather enough entropy from entropy sources like disk
reads, network activity, mouse movement, key presses, etc. to generate this kind
of random number. In a typical cloud hosted virtual machine, these events are
usually quite stable or uniform (as in case of disk and network activity), or totally
absent (as in case of mouse and keyboard activity). Therefore, it takes a much
longer time to generate the required random number of reasonable strength. The
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Functional Encryption based approach, on the other hand, does not have such a
requirement. For it to work, it just needs attributes that are usually in an alpha-
numeric form.
Furthermore, a peer in this approach does not need to get a key signed by the
super peer CA to perform encryption, thus eliminating the need to get a signed
certificate from super peers upon bootstrapping. Due to these main design and
implementation specific reasons, our scheme incurs about 74.2% less overhead
than a PKI based scheme.
6.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we described in detail how we solve the problem of secure service
based resource discovery in our framework. The resources we focus on discover-
ing were the VM IDs, IP addresses and port numbers of the neighbouring peers
in a VPN overlay. The knowledge of these resources is important as they are
required to construct IPsec tunnels between a peer and the other neighbouring
peers that it wants to communicate with. We described how we make use of
the Kademlia peer-to-peer protocol’s resource discovery features to achieve this
goal. However, we still needed to address the issue that the data about a peer’s
resources has to be gathered in such a manner that it remains private and confi-
dential between the valid peers of a VPN overlay.
So we started by describing the threat vectors for this problem in detail. This
mostly focused on Sybil attacks, where a malicious attacker can create or imper-
sonate a large number of fake peers in an overlay and use them to disrupt or
compromise the data and communication. We analysed how this type of attack
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would work in a Kademlia based deployment and worked out the number of fake
peers that will be required to intercept all the peer communication in a Kademlia
based overlay. We discovered that it will require only 14 % fake peers to compro-
mise a Kademlia overlay using a default k-bucket size.
We then gave the details of our security protocol for the resource discovery
process, which is used after the admission control process has been successfully
completed. We described how a certificate authority based scheme can help us
in securing the resource discovery process, but also highlighted its problems with
centralisation and scalability with regard to the overlay size. Therefore, we pre-
sented in detail our novel secure resource discovery model that utilises functional
encryption techniques to accomplish our goals securely and efficiently.
Lastly we described the implementation details of this scheme in our system
and related the experiments we have conducted that measure the time taken by
a peer to discover the identity of other peers currently in its overlay, that is, the
VPN overlay with the same ServiceID. We compared the results of our functional
encryption based scheme with a PKI-based method using RSA algorithm that
we have implemented in the same environment. We showed the time taken by
the secure resource discovery process for 100 experimental instances using our





In this thesis, we present a secure and scalable communication framework for
cloud services/applications deployed in an inter-cloud environment. We employ
the decentralisation and resilience afforded by structured peer-to-peer overlays
to design a novel command and control architecture for managing and operating
the secure communication framework. The construction of a decentralised and
distributed command and control mechanism is one of the main objectives for our
research effort, and is achieved by constructing two tiers of peer-to-peer over-
lay networks, with the upper tier overlay acting as a universal overlay, spanning
across multiple cloud platforms and undertaking the general management related
responsibilities, whereas the lower tier VPN overlay operates within the scope of
a single cloud service that is being deployed on virtual machines on these multi-
ple cloud platform, with the main responsibility of encrypting the communication
between these virtual machines according to the security polices set by the cloud
service owner. Therefore, we are able to offer secure communication functional-
ity to multiple cloud services by using a separate VPN overlay for each service,
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while a single universal overlay acts as the overseer of all the operational VPN
overlays.
We also utilise the inherent ability offered by almost all structure peer-to-peer
overlay networks to handle growing amount of work load. To design and architect
a scalable communication framework is one of our main research objectives. The
main challenge in this regard is that although a single peer-to-peer network might
be able to address this issue relatively easily by using its overlay churn manage-
ment protocol, our architecture design uses two tiers of peer-to-peer overlays.
Although the universal overlay might be a single overlay network in its tier, it has
to instantiate and manage multiple VPN overlays in the lower tier. In order to ad-
dress this challenge, we designate a subset of the peers in the universal overlay
as super peer nodes for the underlying VPN overlay, with at least one super peer
node in each participating cloud platform. This approach provides us with a sta-
ble bootstrapping point, as well as addressing the issue of peer churn in the VPN
overlays, as we can increase the number of super peers in the universal overlay
as the work load in the underlying VPN overlays increases, or vice versa.
Another main objective that we set out in the beginning of this research is
that the communication between the components of the deployed cloud service
should be secure. We achieve this goal by making use of the IPsec protocol to
form the VPN links between the virtual machines constituting a VPN overlay, thus
providing confidentiality and integrity for all the data exchanged between the con-
stituent components of the deployed cloud service. However, this proves to be
just the last lag of the complete security life cycle, and we design a comprehen-
sive and novel combination of application partitioning and security-by-isolation
schemes to formulate the secure establishment and operation of the IPsec links
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between the virtual machines of the deployed cloud service. This is due to the fact
that the sharing and management of IPsec session keys for establishing secure
communication tunnels is a complex challenge in a peer-to-peer environment. As
structured peer-to-peer overlay networks have been primarily designed for fast
and scalable content distribution, security considerations have not been the focus
of the design in most of the existing implementations. Therefore, as a result of this
there are a few well-known security vulnerabilities associated with a peer-to-peer
overlay system, especially concerned with the identity of the peers and the ease
with which they can be spoofed.
So in addition to design and implement a protocol for the generation, sharing
and management of IPsec session keys for establishing secure communication
tunnels, we address the security limitations of the command and control mech-
anism of the communication framework as well. We identify two crucial stages
in the life cycle model of a peer-to-peer communication framework where the ap-
plication of a security model would maximise the secure operation of the whole
framework, before the third and final stage of establishing IPsec links. The first of
these stages is the admission control stage, where the P2P clients running on the
virtual machines of a particular cloud service seek to enrol with the super peers
of the universal overlay in order to join their specific VPN overlay. The second
stage is the resource discovery stage, where the peer nodes of a particular VPN
overlay wish to discover their neighbouring peers in the same overlay so that they
can begin the process of securely sharing the IPsec session keys.
The security of these three stages is of paramount importance in order to se-
cure the complete life cycle of the inter-cloud virtual private network. According to
the principals of security engineering, we decide to secure each of these stages
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using different security mechanisms, so that the compromise of the security of
one stage, however improbable, would not make it easy for an attacker to com-
promise the whole system.
Therefore, for the first stage we devise a secure admission control process that
relies on a protocol that we construct according to the concept of zero-knowledge
password proof. As its enabling feature, we allow the owners of the cloud ser-
vice to contextualise their virtual machine images with some security meta-data,
which can be used by our admission control protocol implemented in the P2P
client. These security meta-data can be in the form of simple and easy to remem-
ber passwords, as one of the benefit of using a zero-knowledge password proof
schemes is that the actual password is never transmitted between the peers and
the super peers. However, we also offer and evaluate the option of strengthen-
ing this scheme further by increasing the entropy of the password by using a key
strengthening mechanism.
For the second stage, we devise a secure resource discovery process based
on Functional Encryption schemes. The resources can be anything, like the iden-
tifiers of virtual machines in a VPN overlay, keys, and other security credentials
etc. For this process, we use the peer identities and their cloud service and vir-
tual machine attributes to come up with a protocol, that can encrypt and store
the resources such that only the P2P clients having the right attributes and peer
identity are able to decrypt them. Therefore, it allows us to meet our objective of
secure and scalable key distribution as well, because this scheme too relies on
the super peers of the universal overlay.
A salient feature of our research effort is the practical evaluation of the per-
formance of our solution in a real-world deployment, as we are fortunate enough
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to be given access to two commercial and one academic cloud IaaS platforms
to use as our test-bed. As a result, we are able to show that our architecture
presents a minimal latency and throughput overhead of creating and maintaining
the Inter-Cloud VPN connections among the virtual machines of a cloud service
deployed on multiple cloud platforms, being 5% and 10% respectively. Similarly,
we demonstrate the performance of our admission control scheme as having ap-
proximately 82% more efficiency as compared to a PKI based scheme, and the
secure resource discovery scheme being about 72% more efficient for the same
comparison.
7.2 Challenges and Limitations
The main challenge we face is the diversity of cloud platforms being used by
the cloud infrastructure as a service providers, as each cloud platform has its
own management API for the purposes of account management, virtual machine
management, identity management, etc. We try to overcome this challenge by
customising a virtual machine contextualisation tool that allows us to install and
embed programs and data inside virtual machine images before launching them
in their respective host cloud platforms. This affords a very valuable level of
control to conduct our experiments in realistic conditions over multiple cloud in-
frastructure environments. However, this is not a perfect solution as it requires
the contextualisation service to be extended every time a new cloud platform is
needed to be supported.
Another major challenge is using various cryptographic APIs to manage the
different kinds of security credentials and parameters used in the different pro-
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tocols and mechanisms that we have to implement. So although the security
engineering principals of system partitioning and security-by-isolation makes for
a robust solution, it also makes for a quite complex implementation. The most
difficult part is to deal with the integration issues between modules that use differ-
ent encoding structures and standards for their security credentials. For example,
most of the Public Key Infrastructure APIs use the Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1) standard for the certificates and public, private keys, whereas most IPsec
implementations in Linux require the credentials to be in PEM (Privacy-Enhanced
electronic Mail) format, and the library implementing Functional Encryption uses
Basic Encoding Rules (BER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER).
Another challenge that we address in our work is the complexity of manual
configuration and dependency resolution for the deployment of P2P clients in the
virtual machines. The later issue has been resolved by the contextualisation tool
mentioned before, and the remaining peer related configuration aspects were au-
tomated by using the DHT of the peer-to-peer overlays as the shared storage
for the configuration data and implementing a periodic update feature in the P2P
clients to check for their service related updates regularly against known index/-
content keys in the DHT. However, the former issue is more challenging, espe-
cially in case of virtual machines’ networking and IPsec related configurations.
This is due to the reason that only one of our cloud platforms (Flexiant) assigns
public IP addresses to all of its virtual machines, while the other two cloud plat-
forms only offer NAT based networking, which assigns private IP addresses to
virtual machines which all map to a single public IP address. This breaks the
end-to-end design of the network layer and makes these virtual machines inac-
cessible from external networks.
172
7. Conclusions
This is a tough problem to overcome as it also makes it impossible to use
IPsec in AH mode, as it is incompatible with NAT. This is because the Source IP
Address field of the IP packet header is included in the integrity checking process
of the IPsec AH mode, and as this field is changed in a NAT environment, the
integrity check fails at the recipient. In order to overcome these issues, we have
to implement a NAT Traversal module in our P2P clients that is able to detect if
the peer is behind a NAT firewall and modify the IPsec policy accordingly to adapt
for this situation.
7.3 Future Work
We also highlight some the limitations of our research effort that we intend to ad-
dress as future work. From the security perspective, one of the main issues cur-
rently not addressed in this work is the handling of Denial-of-Service attacks. In
the case of peer-to-peer overlays, the most common form of a Denial-of-Service
attack is to flood the overlay with bogus traffic, thus preventing the peers with
processing legitimate traffic. This type of attacks are very difficult to handle, even
by increasing the computational and network resources, as the attack can also
be scaled by distributing it. Although there are some methods that can be utilised
to mitigate the effects of a dDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attack, they are
effective only against a limited number of simultaneous attacks. However, this
problem has to be addressed to make the communication framework as robust
as possible.
Another feature that needs to be focused on in the future is the dynamically
update the components of the communication framework. In our architecture, an
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additional advantage of using our two-tiered overlay approach is that the peers
of a VPN overlay can get, update and modify the P2P client program dynami-
cally from the super-peers in the universal overlay. This possibility can be further
enhanced to install or run any program on the virtual machine hosting the peer
node. This will add the valuable feature of a dynamic code delivery service to this
architecture. The program to be run can be signed by the super-peers for valid-
ity and it can check for updated versions of itself by querying for the associated
ServiceID in the persistent store of the universal overlay’s DHT.
Overall, we feel that the research contributions made in this thesis with re-
gard to the ICVPN architecture can be very useful to the cloud service providers
and developers to highlight the high level requirements of users and applications
that want to construct a secure communication framework to fulfil their needs.
The ICVPN research effort has also validated two novel specific state-of-the-art
security protocols, providing insights into their use in an inter-cloud environment.
Lastly, a major achievement of our research efforts is its real-world deploy-
ment and evaluation. Simulations and emulations of such large scale systems
as ours are not a substitute for deployment, as in most cases it is impossible
to understand ahead of time the impact of the environment on technology and
this is usually critical to system design. Real-world deployment and evaluation
is the only way to fully investigate the complex interactions between the cloud





Most of the current cloud Infrastructure-as-a-Service providers enable rapid pro-
visioning of virtual machines for their users. This in turn allows the users of the
cloud platforms to scale up and down their cloud services and applications on-
demand. However, this flexibility in virtual machine provisioning introduces a new
set of challenges for dynamic service configuration, one of the main challenges
being the contextualisation of the virtual machines.
1 Contextualisation
We define contextualisation is a set of processes and mechanisms that enable
us to modify the virtual machine images in such a way that external data and
programs can be placed inside well known locations in these images. VM con-
textualisation is a valuable tool especially in the use case scenarios of inter-cloud
and multiple cloud platforms for reasons of interoperability. Most cloud service
providers offer IaaS services that are not interoperable with each other. In this
respect, VM contextualisation can be used for enabling interoperability between
IaaS providers by by-passing their native platform services.
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2 Architecture
The VM Contextualization service of the OPTIMIS toolkit [64] provides us with
two capabilities. The first capability is a bootstrap mechanism to prepare a VM
image for embedding the appropriate context in it. The second capability provides
a mechanism for creating ISO CD-ROM (International Organization for Standard-
ization Compact Disc Read-Only Memory) images that contain the context data
and operating system specific scripts for processing the context data.
The main purpose of the VM Contextualisation tool is to prepare a VM image
in such a way that it is able to receive the context data in a reusable fashion. It
operates by mounting a VM image using the QEMU quick machine emulator [60]
and modifying it to include a collection of programs and scripts that are usually
run at the operating system boot up. When a virtual machine instantiated from
a contextualised VM image is launched in a cloud platform, it can run these pro-
grams and scripts and access contextualisation data held within an ISO image
attached with the VM.
3 Advantages
The use of an ISO image as a mechanism to store the contextualisation data pro-
vides a facility to separate the contextualisation data from the VM image and re-
moves the time consuming process of creating multiple VM images with different
contextualisation needs. Furthermore, all cloud computing and virtualisation plat-
forms provide the feature of attaching ISO images with virtual machines, making
this tool universally usable. This also enhances the security of the contextuali-
sation process, as sensitive security related data and meta-data is not stored on
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Figure A.1: Interaction between VM image and ISO Image at run time [13]
the VM itself but on the ISO image, where it can be periodically refreshed or even
deleted by the VM contextualisation tool.
Figure A.1 shows the instance-level contextualisation process of a VM when
it starts its execution at system boot up. During the boot process, the contex-
tualisation tool mounts the ISO image containing the contextualisation data and
the programs and scripts. These scripts and programs can perform all sorts of
operations on the guest operating system of the virtual machines, like modifying
configuration of installed programs, install additional software and resolve their
dependencies, and establish network connections with other virtual machines etc.
etc. Furthermore, these programs can be made to execute in daemon mode, in




A sample listing of the IPsec policy applied to a running instance of a VPN overlay
is given in the listing below. The IP addresses of the VPN peers are detected by
the Peer-to-Peer client software dynamically as they are subject to change in a
cloud environment each time a VM reboots. This particular policy is encrypting
all the ICMP traffic between two peer nodes and all TCP traffic that is incoming
and outgoing on ports 80 and 8080 (standard ports for a web server and Apache
Tomcat server) as this is the traffic belonging to the applications that the service
wants to encrypt.
Sample policy
spdadd 82.223.250.28 217.33.61.85 icmp -P in ipsec
esp/transport//require
ah/transport//require;
spdadd 217.33.61.85 82.223.250.28 icmp -P out ipsec
esp/transport//require
ah/transport//require;
spdadd 82.223.250.28 217.33.61.85[80] tcp -P in ipsec
esp/transport//require
ah/transport//require;





spdadd 82.223.250.28[80] 217.33.61.85 tcp -P in ipsec
esp/transport//require
ah/transport//require;
spdadd 217.33.61.85 82.223.250.28[80] tcp -P out ipsec
esp/transport//require
ah/transport//require;
spdadd 82.223.250.28 217.33.61.85[8080] tcp -P in ipsec
esp/transport//require
ah/transport//require;
spdadd 217.33.61.85[8080] 82.223.250.28 tcp -P out ipsec
esp/transport//require
ah/transport//require;
spdadd 82.223.250.28[8080] 217.33.61.85 tcp -P in ipsec
esp/transport//require
ah/transport//require;
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